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Abstract
The focus of this research is to investigate the minimization of the traditional spacecraft
(S/C) system-level Assembly, Integration, and Test (AIT) timeline to accommodate an urgent
need for a space-based capability.
The reality of emerging threats to U.S. space superiority was a key motivator in the 2007
formation of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), a joint DoD office whose mission includes
the rapid exploitation of new technology and supplementing or reconstituting damaged or
destroyed satellites based on current battlefield needs. The rapid deployment of a new satellite to
meet the Joint Force Commander’s space capability needs is referred to as the Tier-2 approach.
In the Tier-2 model, only two days are allotted for spacecraft Assembly, Integration, and Test
(AIT), a process that typically spans multiple years. Therefore, this type of response will require
a significant departure from the current spacecraft industry’s best practices and concept of
operations.
To investigate their vision, ORS sponsored the Rapid AIT Demonstration – a series of short
AIT trials using the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Plug and Play Satellite (PnPSat-1).
During the demonstration, PnPSat-1 was assembled in different configurations and tested using
multiple personnel groups of varying skill sets to investigate some of the technical and logistical
challenges that face ORS.
A primary goal of the Rapid AIT Demonstration was to investigate influences on AIT
timeline. By timing each trial, it was found that the primary driver to AIT duration was S/C
assembly activities. The trend in assembly duration indicates the timeline is most impacted by
personnel training, mix of skill sets in the assembly team, and efficiency of the assembly
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procedure. Another goal of this research was to verify if the tests in Rapid AIT were sufficient
to detect anomalies prior to launch. There were multiple anomalies in the demonstration, but
only one was not caught during Rapid AIT. It can be postulated that most errors should be
detected in pre-Rapid AIT testing.
Because only two days is given to qualification of a Tier-2 S/C, ORS plans to complete
qualification tests on dedicated qualification models and on all components previous to call-up.
The flight models could then be qualified by similarity to the qualification model during Rapid
AIT. Conclusions from the Rapid AIT Demonstration test data could support qualification by
similarity and the reduction of tests conducted at the system level. Existing thermal and
structural models were updated to predict the thermal properties and center of gravity location of
various S/C configurations. The updated model predictions were within standards of accuracy,
and were created within hours or days, versus months. These results indicate that well-tuned
analytical models of the qualification model can be quickly updated to accurately predict
properties for a variety of S/C configurations. This could provide some confidence in a S/C
design without extensive testing.
Finally, an extensive list of lessons learned from the Rapid AIT trials have been compiled
for incorporation into Tier-2 concept of operations. For example, it was found that the number
of personnel on the AIT team was less important than the correct mix of skill sets, and that the
personnel should have well-defined roles. Also, automation, software configuration control, and
situational awareness among team members are critical to decreasing the AIT duration.
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ASSEMBLY, INTEGRATION, AND TEST METHODS FOR
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE SATELLITES

1. Introduction
The focus of this research is to investigate the minimization of the traditional spacecraft
system-level Assembly, Integration, and Test (AIT) timeline to accommodate an urgent need for
a space-based capability. The Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS) was created in
2007 to provide this capability in response to a Joint Force Commander’s needs. This chapter
first provides background on the ORS mission and goals, spacecraft AIT processes, and Plugand-Play (PnP) technology. Following this background information, the problem description and
motivation for this research is given. And finally, an outline of the thesis is provided at the
conclusion of the chapter.

1.1 Background
1.1.1

Operationally Responsive Space
ORS is a joint office reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, born from

emerging threats to U.S. space superiority such as China’s 2007 successful anti-satellite weapon
test and GPS jamming [1]. Space systems can be a force-multiplier, providing intelligence,
communication, and navigation capability. The current Presidential administration supports the
need for ORS as is evident from this quote on the White House website [2]:

The full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities depends on our space systems. To
maintain our technological edge and protect assets in this domain, we will continue to
invest in next-generation capabilities such as operationally responsive space and global
positioning systems. We will cooperate with our allies and the private sector to identify
and protect against intentional and unintentional threats to U.S. and allied space
capabilities.
ORS is charged with providing “assured space power focused on the timely satisfaction
of Joint Force Commanders’ (JFC) needs” [3]. To meet the JFC needs, ORS envisions three
1

possible approaches: employing current systems (Tier-1), deploying new systems with current
technology (Tier-2), or developing new technology (Tier-3), as illustrated in Figure 1. This
research focuses on Tier-2 type solutions.
Tier-2 solutions utilize field-ready capabilities from a complete system, series of
components, or combination thereof. The targeted timeframe for delivering usable Tier-2
solutions is days-to-weeks from the time at which the need is established. The focus of activities
in Tier-2 solutions is on achieving responsive exploitation, augmentation, or reconstitution of
space force enhancement or space control capabilities through rapid AIT, and deployment of
small, low cost satellites.
The 7-day Tier-2 timeline goal, outlined in Figure 2, only allows two days for AIT.
Therefore, a Tier-2 response will require departure from the current space industry’s best
practices and concept of operations. Some of ORS’s ideas for reducing timeline from call-up to
launch include: enforcing interface standards, increasing modularity, extensive component-level
qualification testing, and minimizing system-level testing. This research focuses on ways to
minimize system-level testing timeline.
ORS envisions their rapid satellite response facility, currently referred to as
“Chileworks,” to function more like an aircraft depot than a one-of-a-kind satellite AIT facility
[3] where there are a given number of platforms and sensor packages available. The example
shown in Figure 3 draws a parallel between the U-2 platform with its many sensor packages and
an ORS spacecraft (S/C) bus with its many payload options.
The end-state goal for Chileworks is to have steady-state and surge capabilities by 2015.
During steady-state operations, exercises and testing should be ongoing to maintain AIT-ready
parts and personnel. The surge response will depend on assessed threat level. To meet these

2

goals, component inventory will be required to accommodate production of one satellite per
week, or a small constellation within one month [3].
ORS’s baseline concept of operations to meet these production goals includes a fully
qualified component stock and a selection of qualified satellite bus designs. To investigate their
vision, ORS sponsored the Rapid AIT Demonstration – a series of short AIT trials (3-5 days)
using the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Plug and Play Satellite (PnPSat-1). The goal
of the Rapid AIT Demonstration is to investigate AIT methods which reduce the Rapid AIT
timeline to suit Tier-2 constraints. The following section will introduce basic AIT concepts,
while Chapters 2 and 3 provide an in-depth discussion on AIT methods that can be applied to
ORS S/C.

Figure 1. ORS Approaches to Meeting Warfighting Needs [3]

3

Figure 2. ORS Tier-2 Timeline [4]

Figure 3. Aircraft Depot Model for Satellites [3]

1.1.2

Assembly, Integration, and Test
AIT is the process in which subsystems are integrated together to form a system, i.e. a

spacecraft. AIT is a documented, formal, and sequential process of integrating and testing
components/subsystems and the system to verify specifications and requirements are met [5]. A

4

successful AIT process depends on a well developed test plan, created to outline how each
requirement is going to be verified. The test plan should include tests/activities to identify
unanticipated interactions among the subsystems, failure modes and recovery procedures, faulty
workmanship, and prevent infant mortality (burn-in or wear-in tests). When deviations or
anomalies occur, discrepancy reports are written to identify the problem and facilitate a solution.
The entire AIT phase for a unique S/C can last many years and includes extensive performance
testing – called qualification tests.
Tests are designed to replicate the actual operational environment and scenarios when
possible. The vibration and thermal vacuum tests are designed to replicate the launch and onorbit environments, respectively. Other tests for payloads, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC),
and attitude determination and control subsystem (ADCS) may require the use of simulators or
modeling when realistic test methods are not feasible.
The culmination of the AIT phase is transportation to the launch site, where additional
tests may be necessary to verify the spacecraft survived the shipment from the integration
facility. Testing may continue after the spacecraft is mated to the launch vehicle, but not for the
purposes of validating design. These tests are typically called “aliveness tests” and only verify
the system has basic functionality. Special safety conditions will be in place during these
activities due to launch vehicle requirements.
In the baseline ORS concept of operations, all components, subsystems, and bus
configurations must pass all qualification tests to be accepted into the Chileworks inventory. It
will be from this stock of fully-qualified components/subsystems that a Tier-2 S/C will be
assembled. Because of the previous qualification, the newly assembled S/C, or flight model, will
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complete only a subset of less stringent acceptance tests – called Rapid AIT. The development
of the Rapid AIT test flow will be detailed in Chapter 3.
1.1.3

Plug-and-Play Technologies
In the mid-1990’s, the development of the universal serial bus (USB) and Plug-and-Play

(PnP) technologies for the personal computer demonstrated the possibility of simplifying
complex systems such that unskilled personnel could assemble and operate them quickly. This
idea, and a number of emerging experiment opportunities, inspired the Air Force Research
Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/RV) to investigate PnP technologies for
spacecraft [6].
AFRL/RV’s PnP technology development began with projects testing new electronics
and data handling approaches. Multiple experiments were flown on-orbit starting in 1995 with
the MAPLE-1 experiment hosted on the MightySat-1 spacecraft [6].
In 2003, AFRL/RV began devising the first PnP architectures for what would eventually
be named Space Plug-and-Play Avionics (SPA). SPA is an interface-driven set of standards
designed to enable the six-day satellite. The 2004 Responsive Space Advanced Technology
Study (RSATS) embraced adaptive avionics as one solution to the Responsive Space problem.
Based on the RSATS results, AFRL/RV hosted eight workshops to further the advancement of
the SPA technology. These workshops led to the formulation of the key SPA technology ideas:
Appliqué Sensor Interface Module (ASIM), Satellite Data Model (SDM), and the Extensible
Transducer Electronic Data Sheet (xTEDS). The components of the SPA architecture are
described in Chapter 3.
In 2006, the Responsive Space Testbed (RST) was commissioned at AFRL/RV to
continue the development of responsive spacecraft technologies. Through this effort, Plug-and-
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Play Satellite 1 (PnPSat-1) (Figure 4), the first full spacecraft to implement SPA, began
development in 2007. The goal of the project was to enable design, assemble, and test of a semicustom spacecraft in 2-3 days by simplifying interfaces and hiding complexity from the user. In
2008 AFRL/RV determined that it would be too costly to flight-qualify PnPSat so it is now used
as a testbed for AFRL SPA technology development and for ORS office exercises. Details of
PnPSat-1 are given in Chapter 3. Work on PnPSat-2 has already begun with next generation
SPA technology. However, it is unclear at this time whether PnPSat-2 will be a flight project or
another testbed.

Figure 4. PnPSat-1

1.2 Problem Description
To meet current government and industry spacecraft standards, resulting AIT timelines are
greater than 6 months and sometimes as long as multiple years. A typical Thermal Vacuum
(TVAC) test requires several days and sometimes weeks alone. Meeting all AIT standards within
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the ORS Tier-2 goal to deploy a satellite within 6 days is not possible. To take a closer look at
the challenges of reducing the AIT timeline, ORS has sponsored the Rapid AIT Demonstration at
Kirtland AFB, NM. The focus of this research is to investigate approaches to minimize the
traditional spacecraft system-level AIT timeline to accommodate an urgent need. The research
goal is to provide ORS a set of data-supported suggestions and lessons learned that can be
incorporated into the design of their Chileworks operation.

1.3 Motivation
As described in Section 1.1.1, the ORS office faces a challenge in developing their
Chileworks facility and processes. The typical multi-year AIT timeline must be reduced to 2-3
days, which will require a significant paradigm shift. Because a single TVAC test requires more
than the AIT time allotted, it is obvious that the area of testing will be of huge concern.
However, it would be hasty to eliminate the TVAC test without due investigation. The results of
the Rapid AIT Demonstration can provide a basis for the change ORS requires.

1.4 Outline of Thesis
Chapter 2, Satellite AIT Practices, is divided into 3 sections. Section 2.1, Traditional
Spacecraft Testing, describes the industry-accepted standards for spacecraft AIT, as well as some
studies into the effectiveness of these standards. Section 2.2, Rapid Satellite Production
Examples, and Section 2.3, Applicability of Lessons Learned to ORS, review the examples from
the space industry of rapid production and discusses the applicability of these lessons to the ORS
concept.
Chapter 3, Rapid AIT Demonstration Description, details the development of the Rapid
AIT Demonstration test plan in Section 3.1. Lessons learned from the background review in
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Chapter 2 are utilized in the test plan development. Section 3.2 describes the PnPSat-1 test
article and its limitations with respect to this demonstration.
Chapter 4, Results and Analysis, provides a detailed summary of each trial in the Rapid
AIT Demonstration, to include the objectives and outcomes, in Section 4.1. Section 4.2, Test
Results, gives an analysis of the quantitative environmental test data collected in the trials. And
finally, Section 4. 3, Lessons Learned, will detail the suggestions of the demonstration team for
incorporation into Tier-2 ORS operations. The lessons learned are grouped into the areas of
spacecraft design, facility and equipment, personnel and processes, payload integration, and
ground system and operations.
Finally, Chapter 5, Conclusions and Future Work, provides the conclusions of the research
in Section 5.1, followed by recommendations for continued research in this area in Section 5.2.

9

2. Satellite AIT Practices
This chapter first reviews traditional satellite AIT practices, including military standards and
industry accepted guidelines. These standards and guidelines served as the basis from which the
Rapid AIT Demonstration test plan was created. Following the review of traditional practices,
examples from the space industry where the AIT process has been modified to reduce timelines
are presented. These example programs can provide lessons learned which are applicable to the
ORS goals and constraints, and are summarized in the last section of this chapter.

2.1 Traditional Spacecraft Testing
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) spacecraft test programs are governed by the
Military Standards (MIL-STD), MIL-STD-1540 [7] and MIL-STD-340 [9]. These MIL-STDs
describe the methodology of designing a test program and specifics on test operations.
Guidelines for spacecraft manufacture and test can also be found in various texts such as Space
Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD) [8], an industry-accepted text describing best practices for
space systems design, manufacture, and test, and Space Systems Fundamentals [5]. Guided by
these documents, this section first provides the definitions of some industry-accepted terms used
frequently throughout the thesis. Then, a brief description of the standards and guidelines are
given, and multiple studies of the effectiveness of these testing standards are examined.
2.1.1

Terminology

This section identifies key terms that are used frequently throughout this thesis, as defined in
MIL-STD-1540, SMAD, and Space Systems Fundamentals.
•

Component: Parts that are assembled to perform a higher-level function (ex. Reaction
wheel, solar array).
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•

Subsystem or Payload: Components that are assembled together to perform a specific
function (ex. ADCS subsystem, Power subsystem, Imager optics and processing
components).

•

System: Subsystems that are assembled together whose overall function is to execute
mission requirements (ex. Spacecraft).

•

Qualification Tests: Qualification tests are conducted to demonstrate that the design,
manufacturing process, and acceptance program produce mission items that meet
specification requirements. In addition, the qualification tests validate the planned
acceptance program including test techniques, procedures, equipment, instrumentation,
and software. The qualification test baseline is tailored for each program.

•

Acceptance Tests: Acceptance tests are conducted as required to demonstrate the
acceptability of each deliverable item. The tests demonstrate conformance to
specification requirements and provide quality-control assurance against workmanship
or material deficiencies. Acceptance testing is intended to stress screen items to
precipitate incipient failures due to latent defects in parts, materials, and workmanship.
However, the testing will not create conditions that exceed appropriate design safety
margins or cause unrealistic modes of failure.

•

Component-Level Test: A test conducted on a particular unit (ex. reaction wheel).

•

Subsystem-Level Test: A test conducted on a particular subsystem (ex. ADCS).

•

System-Level Test: A test conducted on the entire spacecraft assembly (ex. Mission
scenarios).

•

Qualification Model (QM): A qualification model is a complete spacecraft produced
from the same drawings, using the same materials, tooling, manufacturing process, and
level of personnel competency as used for flight hardware.

•

Flight Model (FM): A flight model is the complete spacecraft to be sent to orbit.

The system-level tests discussed in this thesis are described in detail in Appendix A.
2.1.2

U.S. Military Standards
The two primary military standards that define government spacecraft test programs are

MIL-STD -1540, Product Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space
Vehicles, and MIL-STD-340, Test Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space Vehicles.
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Spacecraft verification can be accomplished by means of analysis, test, inspection,
demonstration, or combination thereof. From MIL-STD-1540, the primary objectives of
verification are:
•

Verify the design meets performance and interface requirements when exposed to its
operational environment,

•

Verify the manufacturing process ensures products meet specified design requirements,

•

Ensure flight hardware and software are free of workmanship and latent defects and are
acceptable for flight,

•

Validate equipment functionality and procedures necessary to support ground and flight
operations, and

•

Predict and confirm vehicle system integrity and performance through all mission phases.

According to MIL-STD-1540, the qualification test program should verify design and
manufacturing requirements at the lowest level of assembly possible (component or subsystem).
Functionalities that can be affected by integration processes, such as external system interfaces,
should be verified at the highest level of assembly (system). The lowest risk programs are
typically achieved when qualification testing is conducted on a dedicated QM or when there is a
proven flight heritage. From MIL-STD-1540, Table 1 lists numerous potential failure
mechanisms along with the qualification tests that could be used to identify them.
The acceptance test program should verify that there are no latent defects or workmanshipprecipitated failures in flight hardware that could degrade the mission performance or lifetime.
These are less stringent tests than qualification tests. Table 2 lists acceptance tests that could
precipitate failure modes, also from MIL-STD-1540.
MIL-STD-340 describes the government requirements for each qualification and acceptance
test at the unit, subsystem, and vehicle levels, including details such as levels, durations and
margins. Table 3 lists the primary vehicle qualification tests and the probability of them being
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required, and Table 4 lists the primary acceptance test requirements. However, the test program
should be tailored based on spacecraft hardware and software heritage, expected failure modes,
and the level of risk acceptable to the customer.
Table 5 identifies other factors that should be considered when designing a test program.
Many of these factors, such as similarity to previous qualification articles and product
complexity, will be considered in the development of the Rapid AIT test plan, described in
Chapter 3.
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Table 1. Qualification Tests to Identify Failure Modes [7]
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Table 2. Acceptance Tests to Precipitate Failure Modes [7]
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Table 3. Vehicle Qualification Tests [7]
Test
Requirement
Inspection1
R
Functional1
R
Pressure/Leakage
R
EMC
R
Shock
R
Acoustic or Vibration2
R
Thermal Cycle3
O
Thermal Balance4
R
Thermal Vacuum
R
Modal Survey
R
R = High Probability of Requirement
O = Low Probability of Requirement
1. Required before and after each test as
appropriate
2. Vibration conducted in place of acoustic for
compact vehicle
3. Required if thermal cycle acceptance test
conducted
4. May be combined with thermal vacuum test

Table 4. Vehicle Acceptance Tests [7]
Test
Requirement
Inspection1
R
Functional1
R
Pressure/Leakage
R
EMC
O
Shock
O
Acoustic or Vibration2
R
Thermal Cycle
O
Thermal Vacuum3
R
Storage
O
R = High Probability of being required
O = Low Probability of being required
1. Required before and after each test as
appropriate
2. Vibration conducted in place of acoustic for
compact vehicle, less than 180kg
3. Requirements modified if thermal cycle
conducted

Table 5. Test Requirement Considerations [9]
Criticality to mission
Sensitivity to environment
Severity of environment
Knowledge or uncertainty of environment
Similarity to previously qualified articles
Ability to analyze vs. design margins
Maturity of technology
Maturity of production line
Level of assembly vs. simulation
Product complexity
Cost of repair and retest for problems found at
higher level of assembly
Use of qualification models for flightalternative strategies
Benefits of dedicated qualification articles
Prior experience with statistically significant
sample of similar products
Training and experience of manufacturing,
AIT personnel
Use of automated vs. operator performed
manufacturing operations
Manufacturing process controls proven to
produce defect-free products of similar designs
and complexity
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2.1.3

Space Mission Analysis and Design
Used in undergraduate, post-graduate, and continuing education courses, Space Mission

Analysis and Design (SMAD) is a leading text for space systems design and systems
engineering. The text takes the reader through every commonly accepted step of the
development process, from mission design to launch operations. This section will describe the
guidelines for spacecraft AIT as presented in SMAD to provide a background in the traditionally
accepted testing process and timeline.
The S/C AIT process usually lasts at least six months, and in many cases many years [8].
This is primarily due to extensive qualification testing intended to validate the spacecraft design
is suitable to meet its mission requirements. Figure 5 depicts the traditional flow for
qualification tests, which can take more than a year. There are three commonly accepted ways to
qualify a design [8]:
•

Dedicated Qualification Hardware – A separate set of qualification components is
constructed and tested at qualification levels. This set of qualification components is
then assembled into a Qualification Model (QM) of the spacecraft and tested at
qualification levels. This hardware is dedicated to qualification testing and does not
launch.

•

Qualify the First Set of Flight Hardware – The first set of flight components is tested at
qualification levels. These components are then assembled into a spacecraft which is
tested at qualification levels. This spacecraft is launched. This is the “proto-flight”
concept.

•

Qualify by Similarity – Demonstrate that the components and the environments are
identical to previously qualified hardware.
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Figure 5. Typical Qualification Test Flow [8]

Because the qualification process can last more than a year, qualifying a spacecraft by
similarity would be a desirable choice for ORS. The Type Test Theory (Figure 6) states that if
one article passes all qualification tests, an identical article (component, subsystem, system) will
also pass. In other words, the qualification test program qualifies a design by which other
articles can be built. However, validity of the theory is dependent upon ensuring that all
components or systems are built to the same set of engineering data such as drawings,
specifications, procedures and processes. If the article has been built to the same specifications
as previously qualified hardware, less stringent acceptance tests are used to certify workmanship.
The Type Test Theory could be applied to an ORS S/C program to pre-qualify designs, cutting
the on-demand timeline significantly.

Figure 6. Type Test Theory [8]
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2.1.4

Test Thoroughness and On-Orbit Failure Research
Multiple studies have been completed to examine the correlation between test

thoroughness (based on MIL-STD-1540) and on-orbit failures. There are many interrelated
factors that can affect on-orbit failure statistics, some of which are test thoroughness, system
complexity, launch mass, and production sequence. The studies presented in this section use the
Environmental Test Thoroughness Index (ETTI) to rank test thoroughness. The ETTI is a
qualitative technique to subjectively assign a measure of adequacy to spacecraft test programs
based on compliance with MIL-STD-1540 [10]. The ETTI assigns weighting factors for
qualification tests, acceptance tests, and level of assembly.
2.1.4.1 Establishing Minimum Test Standards Based on Complexity
Wendler describes the considerations involved in determining environmental test
standards as “The four C’s”: craftsmanship, complexity, cost, and constraints. While all four
considerations are important, his study focuses on the correlation between S/C complexity,
ground testing and on-orbit failures [11].
Wendler defines complexity of the system by electronic piecepart count, ignoring solar
array contribution. A piecepart is defined as electronic parts that come from a line assembly
production, like diodes, hybrids, resistors, etc. Using past studies and numerous data points on
on-orbit failures, Wendler shows a correlation between on-orbit infant mortality mission
degrading failures (MDF) and ETTI rating.
Figure 7 shows the level of ETTI needed to sustain one, two, or three MDFs for a given
spacecraft complexity. MDFs are defined as failures which cause reduction in mission duration
or availability within the first 120 days from launch. Examples may include a leak in a
propulsion valve degrading mission life, or switching to a redundant unit from a primary unit
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which might degrade mission reliability. It can be seen in Figure 7 that for a spacecraft of lower
complexity (≤ 50,000 piece parts) that relatively low test thoroughness could be tolerated.
However, a more complex vehicle (≥ 250,000 piece parts) would require full MIL-STD-1540
compliance, which includes full qualification testing, to avoid mission degrading failures. Full
compliance can be time consuming and costly; so, some programs implement a shorter test
program with added redundancy in the system. Redundancy can increase risk tolerance, therefore
decreasing the level of compliance that can be tolerated. Redundancy could be a method of
buying down risk for ORS satellites while decreasing test robustness.

Figure 7. Mission Degrading Failures with Respect to S/C Complexity [11]

Because spacecraft testing can be time consuming and costly, Wendler also investigated
ways to optimize the testing based on system complexity. Using complexity to normalize the
family of spacecraft investigated, he examines the optimal number of component-level TVAC
cycles to precipitate/discover discrepancies. Adequate box level testing is important to decrease
the number of failures at the system level where it can cost 10 or more times to remove and fix
the problem [11]. It was found that 10 cycles with 85ºC temperature swings is optimal.
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Anything greater than 10 cycles will probably not result in fewer discrepancies discovered in
system level TVAC, and will needlessly increase cost and time.
The results of Wendler’s study show that spacecraft complexity should be a consideration
when designing a test program. For a spacecraft of given complexity, the level of compliance to
MIL-STD-1540 can indicate the number of expected mission degrading failures on orbit. Less
complex spacecraft may be able to tolerate a low threshold for test robustness with few failures,
while more complex spacecraft could gain tolerance of low compliance with added redundancy.
The complexity of PnPSat-1 and correlated level of test thoroughness will be analyzed for the
Rapid AIT test plan development, detailed in Chapter 3. While complexity can be a method of
determining minimum test standards for a system, craftsmanship, cost, and constraints should
also be taken into consideration. A conclusion can also be made that programs should conduct
adequate component- or subsystem-level tests to eliminate many of the discrepancies discovered
during system-level test.
2.1.4.2 The Influence of Development and Test on Mission Success
Tosney, Arnheim, and Clark collected data on 454 satellites encompassing all U.S.
manufactured satellites launched form Jan 1980 – Nov 1999 for the purposes of correlating test
thoroughness, complexity, launch mass, and production sequence with on-orbit mission failures
[12]. In this case, the failure statistics include catastrophic or degrading failures within the first 3
years of on-orbit operation. Strong correlation was found between on-orbit failures and ETTI.
Figure 8 show an exponential decrease in failures as ETTI rating increases, underscoring the
importance of thorough testing. The relationships between failures with respect to launch mass
or complexity are also quite interesting. Data suggests that as mass or complexity increase, as do
number of failures – with the exception of the lowest mass and complexity categories (Figure 10,
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Figure 9). This outlying category is probably due to the experimental nature of most small
satellites, where the satellites are one-of-a-kind and in a lower level of development.
Experimental satellites also tend to have a lower ETTI than the larger, more complex satellites.
Complexity, in this case, is based on 17 weighted, independent parameters such as payload type,
number of deployables, and redundancy factor.
The final relationship discovered by Tosney et al. is between failures and number of
vehicles produced (sequence number). This is also an exponential relationship, but is even more
striking than the ETTI correlation. The R-squared value for the sequence relationship is 0.94,
while the ETTI R-squared value is 0.88. This is a strong suggestion that as the production
increases the number of on-orbit failures will decrease. This is probably due to lessons learned
being incorporated, workmanship errors decreasing, and equipment errors being discovered and
fixed.
The results of this study make a powerful argument that test thoroughness can decrease
the number of on-orbit failures. However, the most prominent correlation to failures is the
production sequence. As the number of satellites produced increases, there tends to be an
exponential decrease in the number of on-orbit failures. This analysis could suggest to ORS that
confidence in a satellite design and AIT processes can be gained over time.
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Figure 8. Percentage of Failures vs ETTI [12]

Figure 10. Percentage of Failures vs Launch
Mass [12]

Figure 9. Percentage of Failures vs
Complexity [12]

Figure 11. Percentage of Failures vs Vehicle
Sequence Number [12]

2.1.5

Spacecraft System-Level AIT Discrepancy Research
Weigel evaluated over 23,000 spacecraft discrepancies (anomaly reports) to characterize

the types of anomalies found during system-level testing [13]. The anomaly reports studied are
from the development of 224 spacecraft representing at least 20 different programs. The
spacecraft evaluated are from different vendors for both commercial and government programs.
The motivation for Weigel’s research came from the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), a
partnership among U.S. government, MIT, and aerospace businesses. The Lean concept was
born out of the International Motor Vehicle Program research project. It is described as a way to
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“do more with less and less while coming closer and closer to providing customers with exactly
what they want” [13]. A key Lean concept is minimizing waste, which includes discrepancies at
the system level. The spacecraft system-level AIT discrepancy research presented by Weigel is
the first LAI product to solely address the spacecraft sector.
While the product development process of a spacecraft is similar to that of other complex
products, there are some key characteristics unique to manufacturing spacecraft [13]:
•

A typical lot size for spacecraft is 1. Large lot sizes are considered to be around 6-8. The
largest lot size ever produced was 77 spacecraft for the Iridium constellation.

•

Spacecraft are assembled primarily by hand, with extensive touch labor. This large
human-in-the-loop factor greatly increases the chances that discrepancies will occur
during AIT.

•

Typical order-to-delivery cycle spans 24-36 months for commercial programs, 24-84+
months for government programs.

•

As contrasted with aircraft, spacecraft are operated in a “no-return” environment. This
results in risk-averse customers that usually dictate extensive testing and verification.

The reports were studied to determine during which system-level test activity the anomalies
were discovered (Figure 12). It was found that the vast majority of anomalies were detected
during ambient activities – nearly 2/3 of all anomalies reported. The remaining reports occurred
during environmental tests: Shake (including acoustic, vibration, acceleration, and shock),
TVAC and thermal cycle. Of the environmental tests, TVAC testing was the largest contributor
to anomaly detection. Ambient activities include any activity taking place in an ambient
environment not included in the other categories, initial and final functional tests, and any
functional tests not associated with the environmental exposure. TVAC activities include setup
and post-environment activities, TVAC test itself, and immediate post-environment functional
tests.
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Figure 12. Anomaly Distribution Among Test Categories [13]

Some interesting correlations were found in these test categories. First, as anomalies found
during ambient activities increased, those found during TVAC testing decreased. This may
indicate that some of the anomalies reported during TVAC testing could have been discovered in
ambient activities with more time or attention to detail. Secondly, as anomalies discovered in the
TVAC testing activities increased, the number of discrepancies with “Use As Is” corrective
action increased. This may be due to an operator’s misunderstanding of the proper operation at
temperature extremes, resulting in erroneous reports.
The anomaly reports were also categorized into subsystems (Figure 13), root causes (Figure
14), and corrective actions (Figure 15). The primary subsystem reported against was Equipment
with 29%. The items in this category are non-flight, ground support equipment (GSE).
Furthermore, the data in Figure 16 indicates that significant subsystem problems are found at the
system-level testing. Only 35% of all anomalies discovered during system-level test are
problems at the system level. For the purposes of this research, the following definitions are
used:
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•

Subsystem – Electrical Power and Distribution Subsystem (EPDS), Guidance
Navigation and Control (GNC), Propulsion, Payload, Structures and Mechanisms (SMS),
Data Management and Telemetry, Tracking and Command (DMS/TTC), Thermal, Wiring
and Cabling (Harness).

•

Spacecraft – Discrepancies that cannot be traced to a particular subsystem.

•

Equipment – Test equipment or ground support equipment of any type.

The Operator Error, Design, and Equipment categories accounted for the largest percentage
of root causes (27%, 25% and 17% respectively). Half of the failures were caused by nonspacecraft items, such as Operator Error and Equipment.
The primary corrective action amongst the entire data set was the No Action Required
disposition (24%), with the Employee/Operator, Drawing/Spec, Process/Procedure and
Software/Equipment accounting for much of the rest. Only 1% of corrective actions are
categorized as Supplier-Related.

Figure 13. Distribution of Discrepancies Subsystem Written Against [13]
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Figure 14. Distribution of Discrepancies in Root Cause Categories [13]

Figure 15. Distribution of Discrepancies in Corrective Action Categories [13]

Figure 16. Distribution of Discrepancies by Area Written Against [13]
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With Weigel’s research, aimed at better understanding spacecraft anomalies to apply the
Lean concept of minimizing waste, one can draw many interesting conclusions. A summary of
the highest contributor to each category studied is shown below (Table 6). Because the majority
of problems found during system level test were actually recorded against subsystems and
equipment rather than the system itself, it may be beneficial to conduct more testing at the
subsystem-level. It appears to be especially valuable to exercise subsystems with extensive
ambient testing (burn-in) and the TVAC test, which could expose many discrepancies that
increase cost and schedule during system-level integration. Also, because operator error and
equipment account for half of the system-level problems, it would be prudent to employ training
programs and validation procedures for equipment.

Table 6. Summary of Highest Contributors in Each Category [13]
Category
Primary Contributor
Percentage
Ambient
58%
Activity in which
TVAC
36%
anomaly is found
Test Equipment
29%
Subsystem written
against
Use As Is
39%
Disposition
Operator Error
27%
Root Cause
Design
25%
No Action
23%
Corrective Action

2.2 Rapid Satellite Production Examples
There are multiple examples in industry of programs that have updated their AIT processes
with the intent of decreasing the time involved in qualifying a spacecraft. The RADARSAT
program is one example of a traditional satellite program that has updated its processes between
the first and second models with lessons learned and technology advancements [14]. There are
more relevant examples of rapid production of satellites, like Globalstar, which reduced the
timeline for flight models to one week [19]. This section provides a discussion of rapid AIT
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processes employed in the spacecraft production industry. Lessons learned from these programs
can be incorporated into the design of a test program for an urgent-need satellite.
2.2.1

RADARSAT-1 and RADARSAT-2
RADARSAT-1, the first Canadian earth-observing satellite, was launched in 1995 and

continues to provide Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) imagery to government and commercial
users. The 5-year design life has long past, so RADARSAT-2 was developed to ensure a
continued SAR data supply. RADARSAT-2 launched 14 December 2007 with many
enhancements over the RADARSAT-1 design.
The RADARSAT-2 design has evolved from the original, as did its AIT program [14,
15]. During the RADARSAT-1 AIT program, Bus Electronic Ground Support Equipment
(EGSE) and Payload EGSE were developed by the bus and payload developers, respectively.
The two EGSE systems were not easily integrated with one another which lead to the first of the
AIT program changes: utilizing the Mission Operations ground system at both the payload and
system levels. This first change allows the payload specialists, AIT team, and Mission Operators
to be familiar with the in-orbit operating system early on. Using a single ground system while
decoupling payload tests from spacecraft tests decreased complexity and time of the AIT phase.
The RADARSAT-2 program took a different approach to some of the system-level tests.
By using enhanced TVAC technologies and thermal modeling techniques, thermal engineers
were able to correlate the thermal model and TVAC Data to within 5% of the predicted thermal
response. Deployment test methodology was also improved for RADARSAT-2. The
deployment mechanisms were subjected to extensive qualification testing at the unit level
(including TVAC) and were therefore only acceptance-tested at the subsystem and system levels

25

with pre- and post-vibration deployments. Components that were previously qualified were
acceptance-tested at both the unit-level and at the system-level.
While the AIT program did evolve between RADARSAT-1 and -2, some aspects
remained the same. By utilizing the existing test facilities and ground segment, much
complexity was removed. Not only was the equipment proven, but the technicians, engineers,
and operators have experience with them. Experience can be invaluable to solving a problem
quickly and correctly.
By building on the experience of the RADARSAT-1 AIT program, RADARSAT-2 was
able to enhance their AIT program with updated technology and methodology. Requiring
extensive qualification testing at low levels of assembly enabled RADARSAT-2 to reduce the
number and complexity of system-level tests without reducing confidence in the spacecraft
design and construction. Also, by taking advantage of proven equipment and experienced
personnel the number of discrepancies caused by operator error or faulty equipment can be
reduced.
2.2.2

ORBCOMM
Orbital Sciences Corporation’s ORBCOMM program cites market pressures for their

need to depart from traditional satellite production processes [16]. The ORBCOMM
constellation provides world-wide, low cost, reliable, two-way communications. The space
segment consists of 36 small (< 50 kg, 42 in diameter, 6 in pre-deployment height)
communications satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) [17]. ORBCOMM plans to launch 18
second generation satellites with improved capability and Automated Identification System
(AIS) starting as early as 2010 [18]. Figure 17 shows a stack of 8 ORBCOMM satellites during
integration to the Pegasus launch vehicle.
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Figure 17. ORBCOMM Satellites in Pegasus Launch Vehicle Integration [19]

Schedule demands on the ORBCOMM program require tasks to be accomplished in parallel.
Figure 18 depicts multiple ORBCOMM satellites being manufactured in parallel. Another way
they reduced timeline was by testing only basic functionality of components in environmental
tests rather than performance. Also, as the number of satellites produced increases and
confidence is established in AIT processes, some tests are removed from the AIT flow. For
example, only the QM went through shock and acoustic testing, and only the first 4 FM went
through TVAC testing. Table 7 lists all of the test activities for the QM and FM 3-36.

Figure 18. Manufacture of Multiple ORBCOMM Satellites in Parallel [19]
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Table 7. ORBCOMM Test Requirements [16]
Spacecraft System and Environmental Tests

ORBCOMM also employed on-line production processes and automated functional
testing to further improve the AIT flow. All procedures and test scripts are stored on a central
server to allow easy and immediate access to the latest revisions and redlines, and unreleased
versions are not accessible on the AIT floor. The operator will use this same server to check off
completed steps and enter test data to be cataloged. This system has access controls and
permissions, and in some critical steps requires passwords from Quality Assurance Engineers
(QA) to proceed. Anomalies and spacecraft status are also tracked in the on-line system.
Controlled test scripts are used to ensure tests are repeatable and consistent.
The ORBCOMM program was able to cut their AIT timeline by altering the typicallyaccepted testing standards, performing tasks in parallel, utilizing on-line technologies for
configuration control, and enforcing strict AIT discipline. Many of the measures developed in
the ORBCOMM AIT program could be applied to ORS satellite programs to reduce their AIT
timeline.
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2.2.3

Globalstar
Globalstar is a constellation of LEO satellites, used for phone and low-speed data

communications. The first of 52 first-generation satellites (~550 kg each) was launched in 1998,
and concluded in 2000. Bridging the gap in service life between the first- and secondgeneration satellites, eight spare first-generation spacecraft were launched in 2007. The secondgeneration constellation is set to begin launch in 2010. [20]
To reach a production rate of 1 satellite per week, the Globalstar program departed from
traditional AIT processes [21, 22]. Globalstar was successful in launching 64 LEO S/C (500 kg)
in one and a half years. Similar to the ORBCOMM approach, a QM went through a full
complement of qualification tests while FM’s went through an acceptance test sequence to
validate the final assembly. It can be seen in Figure 19 that the acceptance test sequence
consisted of fewer tests than the qualification sequence. TVAC and thermal balance was
reduced to a thermal cycle test, and multiple vibration tests were reduced to only a random
vibration test. Also similar to the ORBCOMM program, FM test requirements were decreased
as confidence in the design and assembly process was gained.
The Globalstar program employed a signature-based approach to determining the likeness
of a FM to the QM by comparing the FM test data (signature) to the QM test data (signature).
Otherwise, additional testing would need to be conducted to establish qualification. For
example, a 5% threshold between the FM and QM natural frequencies was required to call an
FM identical [22]. This threshold will be used when comparing the Rapid AIT Demonstration
data to the baseline data.
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Figure 19. Globalstar Qualification and Acceptance Tests [22]

Because of Globalstar’s unique facility and GSE design, if an anomaly was found within a
specific article, it could easily be removed from the production line to allow troubleshooting
without disrupting the production flow. Each satellite was built on a fixed stand moving between
“islands” – the stations in the production line. Each island performed a specific operation,
keeping personnel focused on one task and limiting the movement of GSE. Also to decrease
timeline, the facility operated two vibration tables simultaneously. Vibration tests were limited
to one axis, utilizing only 1/3 the number of accelerometers used in qualification testing. The
Globalstar program was able to achieve an intensive production rate without impacting the final
product performance [22]. Their AIT methods can provide valuable lessons to be considered in
the Rapid AIT Demonstration. While the facility cannot be altered for this demonstration, the
idea of assigning specific duties to personnel, limiting GSE movement, and reducing vibration
tests will be incorporated into the Rapid AIT Demonstration plan.
2.2.4

Iridium
Lockheed Martin’s Iridium constellation of satellites provides world-wide satellite voice

and data communications. The 66 operational satellites (Figure 20) create the space-based

30

network over which communications are relayed to anywhere on the globe. Along with the
satellite constellation, the ground network and Iridium subscriber products are primary system
components.
Battery &
Radiator

Solar Array Panels (2)

L-Band
MMA (3)
Payload
Electronics

Ka-Band Feeder
Link Antenna (4)

Ka-Band CrossLink Antenna (4)

Launch Configuration

Figure 20. Iridium Satellite Configuration [23]

By departing from traditional AIT processes, the Iridium program achieved low cost (<$13M
per S/C) and rapid production (22 days per S/C) of satellites [23]. Between May 1997 and May
1998, 72 Iridium satellites were launched successfully. The most recent launch was in 2002. As
of 2005, there were 66 operational satellites in the constellation and 12 spares in a storage orbit.
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space President, Mr. Michael Henshaw, stated that
standardized interfaces will be the enabler for spacecraft buses to become off the shelf [24]. In a
speech given at the Air Force Association’s Partnerships in Space Symposium in 1998, Mr.
Henshaw stated the following:
We made some money on Iridium buses. We are going to build 140 by the time
it’s all over. We do every one of them just alike, every time. Do you know that
Iridium is only “thermal vac-ed” on the first bird and the next 150 won’t see the
thermal-vac chamber? I had a lot of sleepless nights over that issue – having
come from a world where for 30 years if you changed a screw, you went back
from thermal-vac. Yet the world is going to higher rates and industry is going to
higher rates because of the uniformity from one unit to the next. You will be able
to get out of expensive cycles of test.
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The Iridium program has some differences from ORS Tier-2 because their mission is
quite different. Iridium is a constellation of duplicate satellites with no change in configuration
between each. Also, the production was continuous, rather than on demand. However, due to
the similar goal of moving the space industry toward rapid deployment of low cost satellites,
some valuable lessons can be learned from the Iridium program.
Some of the lessons learned from the Iridium program are:
•

Design the S/C to facilitate repair and upgrades

•

Use standard design tools (including simulation and modeling)

•

Automate design and development tools (including software coding)

•

Automate testing (scripts, tools, and procedures)

•

Use pathfinder to proof S/C handling, facilities, mechanical GSE (MGSE), and to train
personnel

•

Utilize on-orbit reprogrammable flight software (FSW)

•

Decrease test time by using automation, built-in-tests, self-test and reports, and properly
placed test interfaces

•

Eliminate launch site testing – use only aliveness checks or a self check

•

Eliminate some tests for identical designs.

In 2007, the Iridium LLC announced “Iridium NEXT”, an upgrade to the existing
constellation [25]. This new system will provide greater bandwidth and backward compatibility
for current users. Iridium NEXT will be more than a personal communications network though.
The company envisions NEXT providing many more services to the aerospace community –
global LEO imaging, satellite data relaying, and hosting 50 kg secondary payloads as an enabler
to ORS [25, 26].
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2.2.5

TacSat-2
TacSat-2, considered the first operationally responsive space satellite, was launched 16

December, 2006 and ceased operations 21 December, 2007. The Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration was aimed at implementing rapid spacecraft production, launch, and on-orbit
checkout. Yee describes the methods employed on the TacSat-2 program to achieve reduced AIT
duration from the traditional two to three years to a more responsive 15 months [27].
Yee states that there are multiple areas within the satellite development process that can
be adjusted for shorter duration. The first of these is in the preparation for system-level AIT.
The TacSat-2 program utilized functional engineering models of the components/payloads,
which Yee claims can eliminate ninety percent of the electrical interface issues that might arise
during flight unit integration. The use of engineering models also helped in developing quality
assembly and test procedures. The engineering models were tested on a “FlatSat” testbed, such
that functional testing or troubleshooting could occur in parallel to integration activities on the
S/C (See Figure 21).

Figure 21. TacSat-2 FlatSat Testbed
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Also during AIT preparation, Yee stated that the assembly and test procedures should be
written and validated. The level of detail in the assembly and test procedures should be tailored
to the particular level of expertise of the personnel that will use them. Only the critical elements
of a procedure should be included in the procedure checklist, rather than creating a complete
repository of knowledge that may be cumbersome and time-consuming to follow. Consequently,
a strong training program will need to be implemented to pass on the knowledge required to
adequately perform the AIT activities.
Another area in the satellite development process that can be streamlined is test
documentation, including assembly and test procedures. The TacSat-2 program implemented a
self-documenting test system which recorded all commands and telemetry to/from the spacecraft.
The test scripts created log files, automatically documenting every script-generated response
(commands, error messages) and operator inputs (commands, error descriptions, prompt
responses). When any unexpected condition was encountered, the operator was prompted to
input an explanation and continue or abort for troubleshooting.
Through the use of the test scripts with limit checking and error reporting, the operator did
not need to have expertise with every component/payload on the spacecraft. The script would
alert the operator if an unexpected condition occurred and it would then be up to the operator and
quality assurance representative to determine if the condition was a test glitch or component
malfunction. Troubleshooting periods were also self-documenting through the command and
telemetry recordings and log files.
TacSat-2 is considered the first operationally responsive space satellite and can provide many
lessons to ORS in the areas of AIT preparation, documentation, and test automation. Yee
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identifies using engineering models, a troubleshooting testbed, self-documenting test procedures,
and automated test scripts as enablers to reducing the AIT timeline from 3 years to 15 months.

2.3 Applicability of Lessons Learned to ORS
2.3.1

Limitations of Lessons Learned
There are no perfect analogies between existing spacecraft programs and the ORS Tier-2

concept. In the ORBCOMM, Globalstar, and Iridium examples, the flight models were all
identical to the qualification models. In the ORS concept, the S/C will be of identical
architecture, but not configuration based on mission requirements. This may pose a limitation
on the use of the Type Test Theory (qualification by similarity). Further research to identify how
closely a flight model must match a qualification model in configuration for the Type Test
Theory to apply may be warranted.
The ORS concept also allows for a variable production rate, or operations tempo, based
on the on-demand requirements of the JFC. Variable operations tempo may provide some
logistical challenges for ORS. The level of in-stock inventory, inventory functionality checks,
and personnel readiness are all considerations in determining the Chileworks concept of
operations. To maintain readiness for a six-day call up scenario, where only two days is
dedicated to satellite AIT, the required components must be available and functioning, and the
personnel must be proficient in the AIT process. ORS should consider continual training
exercises in Rapid AIT, which will provide hands-on experience for operators and extensive preRapid AIT system-level testing. The variability of S/C configuration and operations tempo
causes some unique concerns for ORS that should be addressed in future studies.
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2.3.2

Applicable Lessons Learned

Despite some aspects of Rapid AIT that are unique to ORS, there are industry concepts that
can be utilized for a responsive satellite. Some of the lessons from the provided industry
examples that could be considered in developing the Chileworks rapid AIT facility, operations,
and spacecraft are:
•

Develop modular spacecraft design,

•

Standardize interfaces,

•

Eliminate/reduce tests as confidence in AIT process is built,

•

Test only functionality, rather than performance, in system-level tests,

•

Determine a threshold for likeness between Qualification and Flight Models,

•

Personnel should perform one operation to maintain proficiency,

•

Design facility to reduce hazardous and timely spacecraft movement operations, GSE
movement, and cut time between operations,

•

Utilize on-line systems to control and catalog procedures, drawings, and test data,

•

Automate functional tests to ensure repeatability and consistency,

•

Employ experienced personnel for both AIT and operations,

•

Determine minimum testing standards based on complexity of spacecraft and risk
posture,

•

Develop testing standards for components, subsystems, and ground support equipment to
reduce failures exposed during system level test,

•

Reduce complexity of S/C design as much as possible, and utilize redundancy when
appropriate,

•

Execute continual Rapid AIT operations to refine procedures, maintain proficiency, and
detect discrepancies early,

•

Maintain and calibrate test equipment regularly, and

•

Implement a personnel training program.
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These lessons will be considered in developing the test plan for the Rapid AIT Demonstration.
The application of these lessons will be detailed in Chapter 3.
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3. Rapid AIT Demonstration Description
The Rapid AIT Demonstration is a series of tests exploring the premise that current
spacecraft system-level test requirements can be reduced or modified for ORS satellites. This
demonstration was conducted at Kirtland AFB, NM from April-December 2009. This chapter
first describes the objectives and format of the demonstration. Then, the test plan and rationale
are provided. Finally, the PnPSat-1 test article is described in detail.

3.1 Rapid AIT Demonstration Plan
This section will first introduce the Rapid AIT Demonstration, including the trial format,
team members, and responsibilities. Also included is a detailed description of the test plan
development utilizing research presented in Chapter 2. Finally, the personnel, facility, and
equipment requirements are defined.
3.1.1

Demonstration Introduction
Six Rapid AIT trials were completed between April-December 2009. The baseline

testing, conducted at AFRL previous to the demonstration, is referred to as Trial 0. The
objectives of each of the trials can be seen in Table 8.
There are two separate groups of personnel that performed the Rapid AIT activities and
are referred to as Team A and Team B. Team A consists of personnel intimately familiar with
PnPSat-1. Team B is spacecraft technologists that are familiar with AIT but not with PnPSat-1
specifically. The roles of the teams are listed in Table 8 and the team members are listed in
Table 9. Team B will be trained during Trial 1 and will perform AIT on Trial 2. An objective of
personnel changes is to investigate how dependent the Rapid AIT success and timeline are on
number of personnel and mix of skill set. Multiple S/C configuration changes may provide
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insight into how similar a flight model must be to a qualification model to be qualified by
similarity.
Each trial consists of four stages: Planning, Rapid AIT, Validation Tests, and Analyze Data,
as shown in Figure 22. During the planning stage, the procedures, configuration files, and
drawings are updated and reviewed. The Rapid AIT stage is executed by the responsible team
with oversight from the opposite team. This stage is video recorded and timed. Discussion
regarding the Rapid AIT duration will be presented in Chapter 4. The validation tests are a series
of more traditional spacecraft AIT activities such as TVAC and 3-axis vibration tests. These
tests are conducted to further validate that there were no failures precipitated by or missed during
the Rapid AIT activities. Finally, the data should be analyzed to document any problems/failures
and make changes for further trials.

Trial
0

1

2

3
4
5
6

Table 8. Rapid AIT Demonstration Trial Descriptions
Description
Baseline data (pre-demo) will be considered QM
Baseline
data set. Pre-demo runs will validate draft
procedures.
The experts will conduct the Rapid AIT process
Test Initial Rapid AIT
with the new personnel learning. One Team B
Flow
member provides QA.
The experts will conduct the Rapid AIT process
Timed Rapid AIT
with the new personnel learning. One Team B
member provides QA.
Test Rapid AIT
The new personnel will conduct the Rapid AIT
Robustness with New
process with the experts monitoring. One expert
Personnel
provides QA.
New S/C configuration using existing PnP
Change Configuration
components
Media Event – timed assembly and functional tests
Timed Assembly
only
New S/C configuration using existing and new PnP
Change Configuration
components
Objective

39

Roles
Team A Conduct
Team A Conduct
Team B Follow
Team A Conduct
Team B Follow
Team B Conduct
Team A Follow
Team B Conduct
Team A Follow
Team A & B
Conduct
Team A & B
Conduct

Table 9. Rapid AIT Demonstration Team Description
Team

Role

Members

Program
Management/Systems
Engineering

Management, program direction,
technical objectives

Howerton
Moretti

Principal Investigator

Test plan development, record
lessons learned, analyze results

Baghal

Team A

Experienced PnPSat personnel—
Trials 1 and 2 lead and post-trial
validation lead

DiPalma
Stottlemyer
Stroka
Ortiz

Team B

Personnel inexperienced with
PnPSat – Trials 3-4 lead.

Robinson
Lewis
Anderson
Baghal

Figure 22. Rapid AIT Demonstration Trial Process
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3.1.2

Rapid AIT Plan Development
Using previous research, industry-accepted guidelines, lessons learned, expert

knowledge, and standard industry practices, a Rapid AIT test plan was developed by the
Principal Investigator (PI) and various team members. Using MIL-STD-1540 as the basis from
which the test flow originated, tests were modified, reordered, or removed in an attempt to meet
the ORS Tier-2 Rapid AIT timeline. This section will describe the changes to traditional AIT
practices and rationale.
The fundamental assumptions of this research are based on the ORS Tier-2 baseline
concept of operations as follows:
•

Fully qualified components remain in stock at the Chileworks facility,

•

Multiple S/C bus designs have been fully qualified (qualification models), and

•

When the JFC identifies an urgent need, a flight model will be built and tested in
Rapid AIT from the qualified components and bus designs.

3.1.2.1 Type Test Theory
The Type Test Theory is a method of qualifying spacecraft based on similarity to a
qualification model (Section 0). Following the Type Test Theory, the Rapid AIT Demonstration
test suite is focused on workmanship tests rather than design tests because the designs are
assumed to be qualified by similarity. Typically, workmanship tests are thought of as a function
of assembly (bolts torqued, connectors mated). In the case of PnPSat-1 (and future ORS
systems), selecting components and FSW modules to meet desired mission (gathering correct
parts kit) is also a function of workmanship. Therefore, workmanship tests will also consist of
mission scenarios.
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The basis of the Type Test Theory states that the QM and FM must be identical in design.
The QM test data can then be used as a baseline for comparison to the FM data and will
determine the suitability of the FM for flight. Baseline test data was gathered prior to the
demonstration began in March 2009 (Trial 0), and will be considered the QM data used for
comparison in future trials. While not all trials will be identical in configuration to the baseline,
the configurations will be similar due to a lack of component/structure inventory. Because the
bus structure carries the structural load and provides the heat transfer path in the spacecraft [5], a
common bus structure or a selection of common structures could be a first step in assuring
similarity in both structural and thermal responses. In addition to utilizing common structures,
well-tuned analytical models may be an option for predicting changes in structural and thermal
properties for a change in component configuration. A suggested future research topic is to
study how close to identical the S/C must be for the Type Test Theory to apply.
3.1.2.2 Discrepancy Categorization Research
The selection of Rapid AIT activities can be supported by the research conducted at MIT
in 2004 (Section 2.1.5). In a study of 224 S/C and over 23,000 discrepancies, less than 1/3 of
S/C discrepancies were discovered during environmental testing, while over 2/3 of S/C
discrepancies were reported during ambient activities. Also, only 35% of all discrepancies were
categorized as system-level discrepancies. Subsystem and equipment discrepancies made up
36% and 29%, respectively. The high discrepancy discovery rate in ambient activities coupled
with the realization that most discrepancies are attributed to subsystems and equipment suggests
that if sufficient ambient and environmental testing, especially TVAC [13], is conducted at the
component or subsystem level prior to Rapid AIT the majority of failures could be exposed prior
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to Rapid AIT. Therefore, ORS should consider long periods of ambient and environmental
testing on components/subsystems prior to system-level integration to expose discrepancies.
3.1.2.3 Using System Complexity to Determine Test Standards
Using Wendler’s definition of system complexity as number of IEEE piece parts (Section
2.1.4.1), a minimum test standard can be determined. Images of multiple electronics boards
from both the PnPSat-1 avionics and the components were studied. The number of piece parts
on each board was counted, and the average number of parts per square inch of electronics board
was calculated. The total electronic board area was compiled based on the PnPSat-1 receive and
inspection information. This information allowed a system complexity estimate of 23,000 piece
parts. This is less than the lowest category (50,000 parts) in Wendler’s data set. Wendler’s
research suggests that for a risk of one infant mortality mission degrading failure, the PnPSat1testing would need to be 60% compliant to MIL-STD-1540. The more important conclusion,
however, is that the correlation between test thoroughness, complexity, and on-orbit failures is
not linear. PnPSat-1 is smaller and less complex than ORS may envision for Tier-2 S/C. As
such, it would be prudent to conduct an investigation into the affect of complexity on the Rapid
AIT Demonstration results.
3.1.2.4 Lessons Learned
Many satellite programs provide lessons that can guide the development of the Rapid
AIT test plan. RADARSAT is an example of a traditional spacecraft program that decreased
system level test on the second model due to confidence built in their first S/C. Acceptance
based on confidence is the same course of action that the ORBCOMM, Iridium, and Globalstar
programs took in manufacturing their successful constellations. The ORBCOMM program
eliminated Shock, Thermal Balance, TVAC, and Thermal Cycle for Flight Models 9-36 (Section
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2.2.2). The Iridium program only conducted TVAC testing on their first S/C (Section 2.2.4).
The Globalstar program eliminated TVAC and Sine Sweep vibration testing on many of their
FM’s (Section 2.2.3). The Globalstar program gained confidence in their flight models by
comparing the acceptance test data from the FM to the QM data, referred to as a signature-based
approach. The signature-based approach will be used in the Rapid AIT Demonstration, where
the baseline data collected at AFRL acts as the QM data and each trial provides new FM data.
Based on all three of these examples, TVAC will not be included in the Rapid AIT test sequence.
3.1.2.5 Expert Survey
The author conducted a survey of industry experts at the Responsive Space 7 Conference
(RS7) in April 2009. Participants were asked to assign a risk level associated with eliminating
selected system level tests. The responses indicated that with proper qualification testing on a
QM and at the component and subsystem level, only a moderate risk would be assumed by
eliminating any of the tests. Figure 23 shows both the average level of risk assigned by all
participants (mean), as well as the most reported answer (mode). By examining the mode it may
be clearer how the majority of participants assign risk, rather than examining the average which
can be skewed by one answer. Eliminating vibration tests was assigned the greatest risk (4 on a
scale of 1-5). The participants noted that vibration testing can uncover many workmanship
errors that could be induced by the heightened sense of urgency associated with Rapid AIT and
should not be abandoned completely. For this reason, a 1-axis vibration test is included in the
test plan. See Appendix C for the full surveys and Appendix D for the survey results.
3.1.2.6 Requirements Verification Matrix
Based on the PnPSat-1 AIT Manager’s expert knowledge, a set of requirements was
compiled to determine how the spacecraft functionality should be verified. The requirements
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verification matrix can be found in Appendix B. Each requirement was categorized by
verification method: Inspection, Design, Analysis, or Test. Testable requirements were then
categorized into component level tests (performance) on the QM (design tests) or in Rapid AIT
(workmanship tests). Many requirements can be tested during Rapid AIT as they are exercised
during mission scenarios. Also, tests that can be accomplished in a relatively short period of
time, but garner a significant payoff in mission assurance, are included in the test plan.
Using the requirements verification matrix, previous research, lessons learned from
previous AIT programs, and the RS7 survey results, a list of tests to be completed for Rapid AIT
was compiled. The list of Rapid AIT tests, along with the rationale for each, is shown in Table
10. Next, a test flow was created to maximize the process efficiency and minimize the time
required. Typically, the environmental test flow should follow the expected flight sequence
(vibration, shock, and TVAC) [5]. Though TVAC and shock tests are not completed during
Rapid AIT, the test flow will draw on this philosophy. For example, solar array first motion,
deployment, and illumination tests will follow vibration testing. These tests will be followed by
mission scenarios.
Though it may seem counterintuitive to insert a bus functional test in the middle of S/C
assembly, the rationale is actually to save time – if a dysfunctional component is discovered
while the S/C is still in a “flatsat” configuration, it can be replaced or fixed without the added
steps of disassembling the S/C external components and structure. Of course, functional tests
should be completed after all major activities, like assembly and vibration tests, to ensure there
have been no failures induced by the activities. External thermal control blankets and radiator
tapes are installed in parallel to mission scenarios, saving more time than doing those activities
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serially. Throughout the test flow, AIT technicians will be encouraged to accomplish tasks in
parallel, if safety of the S/C and personnel permits.

Figure 23. Risk Associated with Eliminating System Level Tests

Test
Bus Functional Test

Payload Functional Test /
Calibrations
Mass Properties

Table 10. Rapid AIT Activity Summary
Rationale
Short duration test, can be conducted at various levels of integration to
verify components are installed correctly and are functioning. This can be a
time saving step as a fault would be found during this short duration test
before investing time into a more expensive test. Does not verify
performance criteria as this was accomplished in unit qualification testing.
Includes a polarity check of ADCS components.
Verifies payload functionality – critical to mission success.

Verifies all parts installed, ensures launch vehicle requirement met, short
duration
1-Axis Workmanship Vibration
Checking for workmanship errors only. All components are qualified, and
Test - Lateral Axis
similar spacecraft passed qualification tests - therefore design is qualified.
Solar Array Deployment /
Verifies mechanical and electrical interfaces to spacecraft – critical to
Illumination
spacecraft survival.
Mission Scenarios
Ensures all FSW modules for mission profile loaded and functional.
Factory Compatibility Test (FCT)
Verifies spacecraft communication with ground system – critical to mission
success.
* Acceptance minus 6dB is starting level for vibration testing per AFRL/ORS Memorandum of Agreement. If
higher levels are required to validate workmanship, levels will be coordinated between AFRL and ORS.
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Figure 24. Rapid AIT Flow

3.1.3

Rapid AIT Test Descriptions
This section describes some of the tests to be performed in the Rapid AIT test sequence.

The full list can be found in Table 10. Some of the tests listed will not be performed because of
the limitations of the test article or available equipment. Section 3.2 provides a description of the
PnPSat-1 test article.
3.1.3.1 Bus Functional Test
The bus functional test, as described in Table 10, is utilized to show component
functionality during various phases of the Rapid AIT flow. This test is not designed to test
performance of components, rather the basic functionality. It will be run as the spacecraft is
assembled – one time after internal component installation and one time after external
component installation – to verify the components coming off the shelf are not defective. Bus
functional tests are relatively quick tests, and can save time by catching faulty components early
in the assembly process. If faulty components are found, they can be removed, moved to a
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troubleshooting area, and replaced with another without disrupting the Rapid AIT flow. Bus
functional tests are also run after vibration testing to ensure all components remain functional.
3.1.3.2 Payload Build and Test
The payload build and test sequence is not covered in this demonstration. Upon decision
of mission design, a separate flow to build up a payload (whether from component state or as a
whole is yet undefined) would occur concurrently with spacecraft assembly. The payload would
then be integrated to the S/C and functionality verified.
3.1.3.3 Mass Properties
The weight and center of gravity (CG) will be measured during mass properties. A
hanging scale on the lifting crane is used to measure S/C weight. To measure CG, load cells
were placed at three locations on a table/stand. The S/C was lowered onto the load cells, and the
measurements were taken at each location. Measurements were taken as the S/C was rotated one
complete cycle (13 measurements). The values are averaged to determine the measured CG.
The load cells used to take the CG data were only available for Trials 4 and 6. Because
the configurations for these trials were different from the baseline, this data will be compared to
the analytical structural models. The analysis of this data is presented in Chapter 4.
3.1.3.4 1-Axis Workmanship Vibration Test
The purpose of the 1-Axis vibration test is to validate assembly workmanship. The first two
vibrational modes can also be shown by mounting the S/C to the vibration stand such the both
the X & Y axes are excited. This was done to collect the most information possible in the
shortest test time. The X/Y axis orientation is shown in Figure 25. Pre- and Post-random vibe
sine sweeps were conducted. Minimal accelerometers were used, and the locations were
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recorded for repeatability in all trials. Three accelerometers were placed at the approximate
center of gravity height to sense bus rigid body modes; three accelerometers were placed on +Z
panel to sense rigid body modes and the +Z panel drumming mode; and three accelerometers
were placed on +Y panel to sense rigid body modes and the +Y panel drumming mode. Table 11
lists the accelerometer locations. The analysis of this data is presented in Chapter 4.

Figure 25. 1-Axis Workmanship Vibration Test Orientation (45 deg off center)
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Table 11. Vibration Test Accelerometer Locations

3.1.3.5 Solar Array First Motion/Deployment
The Solar Array First Motion/Deployment test is included in the Rapid AIT flow to test
the mechanical assembly of the solar array to the spacecraft bus. The illumination test checks the
electrical connection between the array and the Electronic Power System (EPS). Generally,
illumination should be a fairly quick test since the array is already deployed. However, the
PnPSat-1 solar array is not designed to be deployed on the ground. So, for PnPSat-1 Rapid AIT,
the first motion test will be validated with the array mounted to the spacecraft, and then will be
removed for deployment (walk-out) and illumination. Removing the solar array is not desirable
because it takes considerably longer than an array which can be deployed while installed on the
S/C.
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3.1.3.6 Mission Scenario Tests
Mission scenarios is a simulation of the expected on orbit operation of the S/C. They do
not test all of the components, but do engage all ASIMs. The mission scenarios check the
Mission Flight Software (FSW) rather than component functionality, further validating the
rationale for multiple simple bus functional tests as described above. A limited set of critical offnominal/fault management cases are tested in the mission scenario. Any additional off-nominal
cases should be validated in mission FSW build and test, occurring concurrently with SC mission
design and assembly. Mission FSW build and test will not be accomplished during this
demonstration due to limited component and FSW module inventory.
3.1.3.7 Factory Compatibility Test
The factory compatibility test (FCT) is an end-to-end communications verification. The
FCT was not completed during the demonstration due to unavailability of proper test equipment.
However, the demonstration is designed to simulate as much of the flight command and
telemetry path as possible with both UHF and S-Band radios via the communications portion of
the bus functional test. Only the ground antenna and pointing system will not be exercised.
Because of security constraints, the S-Band radio will be operated in the bypass mode (no
encryption) during the Rapid AIT. It will be verified in the encrypted mode during validation
testing.
3.1.4

Validation Test Flow

The purpose of the validation tests conducted at the conclusion of the Rapid AIT phase are to
uncover if any discrepancies were missed or precipitated by the Rapid AIT phase. Table 12
provides a summary of the tests included in the validation series, and Figure 26 depicts the test
flow. This section will give a brief description of some of the tests.

51

Table 12. Validation Testing Summary
Test

Details

Bus Functional

Same as Rapid AIT (Table 10)

Vibration Test

3-Axis Vibration Test ESPA acceptance level minus 6dB*

Mission Scenarios

12 orbits including off-nominal orbits

Hot/Cold Balance (25°C / 10°C),
1 Cycle (30°C / 0°C)
RF Emissions
In-air Radiated Emissions
*Acceptance minus 6dB is starting level for vibration testing per AFRL/ORS Memorandum of
Agreement. If higher levels are required to validate workmanship, levels will be coordinated between
AFRL and ORS.
Thermal Vacuum

+

Figure 26. Rapid AIT Validation Test Flow
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3.1.4.1 3-Axis Vibration Test
The full 3-axis vibration test is conducted during the validation test series to verify the
primary vibrational modes in all three axes. Pre- and post-random vibe sine sweeps are
conducted. For this vibration test, additional accelerometers were placed on the solar array
restraint panel and bus structure. Table 11 shows the accelerometer locations. The analysis of
the 3-axis vibration data is presented in Chapter 4.
3.1.4.2 Thermal Balance/TVAC
The thermal balance and TVAC tests will verify the S/C thermal properties at steady state
conditions and temperature extremes. Thermal balance consists of a hot and cold balance at
25°C and 10°C, respectively. The following TVAC test will include one temperature cycle from
30°C to 0°C. Mission scenarios are executed throughout the TVAC test.
External thermocouples were mounted for Trial 1. Figure 27 shows that the external
thermocouples and internal panel temperature sensors matched within 1°C, so only internal panel
temperatures were used for the remaining tests. The comparison of this data to the baseline tests
and analytical model is presented in Chapter 4.
3.1.4.3 Radiated Emissions Test
The radiated emissions test is used to verify proper S/C function in conjunction with the
expected radiation from subsystems or components. The radiated emissions test was only
completed during Trial 2 validation. It was determined that because of the background noise and
unavailability of an anechoic chamber it would be too difficult to find small anomalies. Major
anomalies should be found in the radio functional tests, which are part of the bus functional test.
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Figure 27. Comparison of External Thermocouples and Internal Panel Temperatures (Deg C)
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3.1.5

Facility Requirements
The Aerospace Engineering Facility (AEF) housed the Rapid AIT Demonstration. A

10,000-class clean tent, equipped with S/C integration stand, shelves, tool kits, work benches,
and clean room attire was used. The facility also houses a vibration table and thermal vacuum
chamber. Figure 28 depicts the facility layout and Figure 29-Figure 31 are images of the primary
support equipment.
3.1.6

Personnel Requirements
The personnel executing the Rapid AIT Demonstration are broken into two teams. Both

teams consist of 3 people each: one lead engineer, one or two assembly technicians and one test
conductor. One person from the opposite team will provide QA during each trial. This requires
full time support from members of both teams during each trial.
During the validation test flow, other personnel may be required. The thermal vacuum test is
planned for four days and is a 24-hour test. At least two personnel must accompany the S/C
during the entire test and must be familiar with executing the Mission Scenario test scripts.
Both the vibration table and thermal vacuum chamber require operators provided by the
AEF Staff. The number of operators is left to the discretion of the AEF.
3.1.7

Ground Support Equipment Requirements

The following ground support equipment is required to carry out the tests in the Rapid AIT
flow as well as validation testing are listed in Table 13 for completeness. The Electrical Ground
Support Equipment (EGSE) is shown in Figure 32.
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Table 13. Ground Support Equipment
Ground Support Equipment
S-Band Ground Radio
S-Band Hat Couplers
PRC‐117 Radio
UHF Hat Coupler
Fiber Optic Cabling
KI-17
TT&C
Direct Connect ASIM
Direct Connect Serial Connection
RIMS Command & Telemetry
Workstation
Long Haul Computer
Short Haul Computer
Solar Array Simulator
Power
UPS
Satellite Design Tool
Diagnostics Digital Volt Meter
Diagnostic Harness
Integration Stand
Crane and Lifting Straps
10-100 Epoxy
Mechanical
30"lb Torque Screwdriver (2)
Miscellaneous Hand Tools
Fastener Lubrication
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Workbench

Tool
Box

2.5'x5'

Admin

Vibration
Table
4'x4'

Class 10K
CleanTent
21'x21'
3-Dimensional
Ceiling-Mounted
Crane

Simulation
GSE

Workbench
2.5'x5'

Storage
Shelves
2'x12'

Storage
Shelves
2'x12'

SC
EGSE
Thermal
Vacuum
Chamber
7' internal
diameter x
11' length

Satellite
Integration Stand
6'x8'

RIMS
CMD/
TLM

Workbench
3'x6'
Camera

GMSEC

Figure 28. AEF Facility Layout

Figure 29. AEF Thermal Vacuum Chamber
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Figure 30. AEF Vibration Table

Figure 31. AEF Clean Tent
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Figure 32. PnPSat-1 EGSE

3.2 PnPSat-1
In 2007, AFRL/RV began development on PnPSat-1, the first full spacecraft utilizing SPA
architecture. However, it was decided that the cost of making PnPSat-1 flight worthy
outweighed the benefits of launching it. PnPSat-1 is now a testbed for AFRL/RV technology
development and ORS exercises. PnPSat-1 is on loan from AFRL as the test article for the
Rapid AIT Demonstration.
3.2.1

Structure
The PnPSat-1 structure is constructed of six modular panels with standard PnP

mechanical and electrical interfaces. The panels are equipped with locking hinge joints to allow
quick assembly and easy interior access. The PnP mechanical interface is a 5.0 x 5.0 cm grid
mounting pattern, across both internal and external surfaces. The structural description is
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summarized in Table 14 . The mass of the structure includes the enclosed electronic
infrastructure.
The electronics infrastructure is recessed within the clamshell-style panels, as shown in
Figure 33 and Figure 34, to increase footprint area and volume for components. The electronic
infrastructure inside each panel provides power and data to endpoints, or “outlets,” on the
exterior surfaces of the panel. There are also power and data connections between each panel to
ensure a complete satellite power and data network. Components with PnP-standard electrical
interfaces can be connected to any endpoint on the spacecraft. Figure 35 is an image of the
TacSat-2 interior and Figure 36 is an image of the PnPSat-1 interior. It is can be seen by
comparing these two images that the PnPSat-1 panel-enclosed electronics increases the available
internal volume and decreases complexity in assembly.
The S/C coordinate system’s origin at the center of the interface of the Motorized Light Band
(MLB) separation system and the launch vehicle adapter (Z=0) and the geometric center of the
launch vehicle interface (X=0, Y=0).
Figure 37 shows the PnPSat-1 coordinate system. This reference frame will be used to
describe the component location for each trial. For example, the top deck panel is referred to as
the +Z panel, and the bottom deck (launch vehicle adapter) panel is referred to as the –Z panel.
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Table 14. PnPSat-1 Structure Description
External Dimensions
51 x 51 x 61.2 cm
Number of Panels
6
Total Mass
41.6kg

Figure 33. PnPSat-1 Clamshell Panel Illustration [28]

Figure 34. PnPSat-1 Panel Interior [28]
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Figure 35. TacSat-2 Interior [28]

Figure 36. PnPSat-1 Interior [28]
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Figure 37. PnPSat-1 Coordinate Frame [29]

3.2.2

Avionics

PnPSat-1 Space Plug-and-Play Avionics (SPA) infrastructure includes:
•

Appliqué Sensor Interface Module (ASIM) (one per component) – Data, power, ground,
and time sync interface for each component; Contains component-specific xTEDS, the
device description file similar to a driver;

•

Robust Power Hub (one per panel, Figure 34) – Provides power distribution to all
endpoints;

•

SpaceWire Router (one per panel, Figure 34) – Provides high speed data
interconnectivity between all endpoints;

•

Hardware in the Loop (HWIL) Router (one per panel, Figure 34) – Provides “test
bypass” access during any stage of integration for one component or the entire
spacecraft to a singular simulation tool.

3.2.3

Software
The Satellite Data Model (SDM) is the PnP-enabling software. SDM’s primary job is

upon system startup - registering the components and applications along with their location in the
SPA network, and learning their command and telemetry parameters via their xTEDS. This
enables SDM to make and manage the necessary connections between components and
applications (Figure 38). For example, if an ADCS application requires magnetometer

63

telemetry, SDM will make the connection between the ADCS software and the magnetometer
ASIM software. Once the connections are made at startup, SDM is largely inactive, until another
connection is requested.
An example of a connection that may be requested after system startup is the request of
telemetry data at the ground station. To request telemetry, a user (ground user, device, or
application) is said to “subscribe” to that data. Conversely, the user can also “unsubscribe” the
data when it is no longer needed. In an operational satellite, the use of subscriptions can ensure
that the bandwidth, both on the SPA network and in the downlink, is being utilized by only the
necessary or highest priority data.

Figure 38. Satellite Data Model Interaction with Components and Applications
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3.2.4

Hardware Components
Components can be made PnP-compatible by adding an ASIM to the device. The ASIM

acts as the interface between SDM and the device and is the enabler for self-configuration and
description. The ASIM houses the xTEDS, a file which describes the device completely –
command and data, usage, and operational constraints. If a component is PnP-compatible, it
should be able to be integrated into any PnP bus with little effort. For this experiment, we have a
limited number of PnP-compatible components. The list of available components and their mass
is given in Table 15. While this list comprises the available components, it is possible that all
components may not be utilized in every trial. The S/C configuration for each trial will be
detailed in Chapter 4. The baseline configuration is shown in Figure 39.

Figure 39. Baseline S/C Configuration [29]
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Subsystem

Structure

Power

Avionics

ADCS

Telecom

Experiments

Thermal
Harnessing

GSE

Table 15. Available PnP Components [29]
Mass Each
Component
Quantity
(kg)
Bottom Deck
1
6.486
Top Deck
1
6.396
Thru-Side Panel
1
7.230
Common Side Panel 1
1
7.170
Common Side Panel 2
1
7.170
Common Side Panel 3
1
7.170
Launch Vehicle Adapter and Hardware
1
4.185
Motorized Lightband and Hardware
1
2.943
Structure Subsystem Total
Battery
1
10.420
Energy Storage Module (ESM)
1
2.506
Solar Array
1
7.395
Solar Array Controller (SAC)
1
1.762
Power Subsystem Total
Intelligent Data Store (IDS)
3
1.200
Real Time Clock (RTC)
1
0.392
Avionics Subsystem Total
Reaction Wheel Assembly
3
4.521
Torque Rod
3
0.720
Magnetometer
1
0.480
Coarse Sun Sensor (CSS)
2
0.524
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
1
0.360
Star Tracker
1
0.820
GPS Receiver
2
0.696
ADCS Subsystem Total
UHF Radio
1
0.775
UHF Antenna
1
1.900
S-band Radio
1
4.170
S-band Antenna Assembly
2
1.135
Telecom Subsystem Total
Long Range Imager
1
1.290
Wide Range Imager
1
1.100
Automated Identification System (AIS)
1
1.080
Experiment Total
Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI)
1
1.690
Thermal Subsystem Total
Component and Experiment Harnessing
1
0.850
Harnessing Subsystem Total
Lifting Blocks
3
0.098
Direct Connect Box
1
0.340
Spacer Ring
1
2.735
GSE Component Total
Spacecraft Total
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Total
Mass (kg)
6.486
6.396
7.230
7.170
7.170
7.170
4.185
2.943
48.750
10.420
2.506
7.395
1.762
22.083
3.600
0.392
3.992
13.564
2.161
0.480
1.048
0.360
0.820
1.392
19.825
0.775
1.900
4.170
2.270
9.115
1.290
1.100
1.080
3.470
1.69
1.690
0.850
0.850
0.294
0.340
2.735
3.369
113.143

3.2.5

Limitations of the Test Article

As mentioned previously, PnPSat-1 was never flight-qualified due to cost constraints, and is
now used as a testbed for AFRL SPA technology development and for ORS office exercises.
There are violations of the two assumptions that the flight model is identical to the qualification
model and that all components are fully qualified. These limitations are described below:
• Demo configuration does not match the QM configuration exactly:
- The MCU110 radio encryption device is not in the demo configuration. Due to
security issues and concerns about extending the lifetime of flight hardware, the
MCU110 will not be installed for the demonstration. The MCU110 is a relatively
small mass (680 g) as compared to S/C mass (113 kg) and should not significantly
affect any system level properties.
- Due to concerns about extending lifetime of flight hardware, the star tracker was
removed from the demonstration. A mass model is in its place for all tests.
•

Most components are not flight qualified and the PnPSat-1 system has not been qualified
launch ready. This is a violation of the assumption that all components are space
qualified. This presents a complexity to the demonstration in that the components may
fail from an unknown cause.

•

Payload build and test timeline not fully demonstrated - assembling, maneuvering,
calibrating, aligning sizeable or sensitive payload could increase Rapid AIT timeline and
complexity significantly.

•

PnPSat-1 is smaller and less complex than envisioned ORS-class satellites. Scaling up
the AIT timeline may not necessarily be linear since bus design and payload requirements
may be more complex.

•

Facility layout may not be conducive to Rapid AIT. Ideas may come out of this demo on
how to more efficiently design an integration facility for Rapid AIT.

•

The solar array must be removed from PnPSat-1 for walkout and illumination tests.
Removal and reinstallation of the array breaks the configuration of the satellite postvibration test and adds time to the process.

•

Thermal blanketing is not realistic with current technology or processes. PnPsat-1
already has fit-checked blankets, and creating new blankets will not be demonstrated.

•

Vibration tests will be conducted to 6dB less than ESPA acceptance levels. While this
change will not affect the determination of the primary structural modes, these levels may
not be adequate to find workmanship errors.
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4. Results and Analysis
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the Rapid AIT Demonstration. First, a
summary level description of each trial is given. Then, test results and lessons learned are
presented.

4.1 Trial Summaries
There were six Rapid AIT trials conducted during this demonstration, April - December
2009. Table 16 describes the S/C configuration, personnel responsibilities, date, purpose and
duration for each of the Rapid AIT trials. The baseline qualification tests conducted at AFRL
prior to the start of the Rapid AIT Demonstration is referred to as “Trial 0.” The following
subsections will detail the activities of each trial.
Table 16. Rapid AIT Demonstration Trial Summary
Trial

Date

Purpose

Rapid
AIT

Validation
Tests

Rapid AIT
Duration

0: Baseline Configuration
“Qualification Model”

Feb 09

Traditional set of tests to
Qualify Design

No

Yes

Multiple weeks

1: Baseline Configuration*
Team A Leads, Team B
Training

9-11
Apr 09

Process and Procedure
Validation; Train Team B
personnel

Yes

Yes

7:02 Assembly;
21:58 Total

2: Baseline Config.* (RS7)
Team A Leads, Team B Assists

28-30
Apr 09

Timed Trial; Optimize
Procedure

Yes

No

4:10 Assembly;
18:28 Total

3: Baseline Configuration*
Team B Leads, Team A Assists
(Q/A Only)

11-13
May
09

Personnel Investigation Training, Skill Set, Number of
Personnel; Optimize Procedure

Yes

Yes

9:10 Assembly;
26:04 Total

4: Sun-Sync AIS/Imaging
Config.*
Team B Leads, Team A Assists

8-10
Jun 09

New Configuration Using
Same Component Set

Yes

Yes

6:20 Assembly;
22:07Total

5: Sun-Sync AIS/Imaging
Config.* (Media Day)
Both Teams, select members

23 Jun
09

Timed Assembly and
Functional Test; New
Configuration; Personnel Skill
Set; Optimize Procedure

Yes

No

1:28 Assembly;
Total Undefined

6: Multi-Spectral Imaging
Configuration*
Both Teams, select members

14-17
Dec 09

Build and Integration of New
Payload (MSI Imager), Timed
Assembly

Yes

No

2:51 Assembly;
Total Undefined

*Star tracker mass model installed rather than Flight Model; MCU-110 only installed for TVAC.
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4.1.1

Trial 0 (Baseline)
Trial 0, the baseline qualification tests, were conducted at AFRL in February 2009. The

data gathered in those tests was used as a comparison for data gathered in the Rapid AIT trials.
The S/C configuration for the Trial 0 environmental tests is shown in Section 3.2.4. The total
S/C mass is 113.1 kg.
4.1.2

Trial 1
Trial 1 was the first implementation of the Rapid AIT Demonstration test plan. Team A,

the experienced PnPSat-1 personnel, executed PnPSat-1 AIT and used this trial to train Team B.
They also used this time to test procedures and verify GSE setup. This exercise resulted in a
change to the level of detail in the procedures to provide more information for Team B.
The S/C configuration was identical to the Trial 0 configuration with a few minor
exceptions. The star tracker was removed and returned to AFRL for use on a flight program. A
mass model is used in its place. The MCU-110, the S-Band encryption device, was not used in
any of the Rapid AIT tests. Because the MCU-110 is an encryption device, it must remain in a
safe unless being monitored by cleared personnel. Because of the security concerns of constant
monitoring, it will only be installed during TVAC testing, when personnel must accompany the
S/C at all times anyway.
4.1.3

Trial 2 (RS7)
Trial 2 was conducted concurrently with the Responsive Space 7 Conference (RS7) and

was broadcast to the conference attendees. Team A conducted the activities, but had assistance
from Team B. The S/C configuration is the same as Trial 1. All activities in the Rapid AIT test
flow were completed, but a validation test series was not completed due to time constraints.
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4.1.4

Trial 3
This was the first trial led by Team B. The configuration was identical to the previous

trials. Team B struggled with the lack of detail in the assembly procedure, resulting in lengthy
assembly duration. The format and level of detail was adjusted throughout the trials in attempt
to find an appropriate format. Suggestions on procedure format can be found in the Lessons
Learned.
4.1.5

Trial 4 (Configuration Change)
Trial 4 included the same hardware components used in Trials 0-3, but many components

were relocated on the bus structure. In this trial, Team B led all Rapid AIT activities, and Team
A provided quality assurance.
There was a very good demonstration of using the computer-controlled cutting table to
create patterns for thermal blankets and radiator tape. The computer aided drawing (CAD) solid
model was used to generate patterns that were cut and applied real-time during Rapid AIT. An
old version of SolidWorks software was installed on the computer for the cutting table. Once the
model was converted, the tapes were cut in a matter of hours. Also, a simplified thermal model
was created for the new configuration in one-half day for comparison with the TVAC data.
4.1.6

Trial 5 (Media Day)
As Trial 5 was primarily a media event, only the assembly and functional tests were

executed. The configuration was identical to Trial 4, minus a faulty processor. Assembly
members for this trial were selected from both Team A and Team B, based on skill set.
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4.1.7

Trial 6 (Additional Payload)
A new PnP-compatible imaging payload was provided for Trial 6 which can be seen in

Figure 40. The payload was delivered in a modular state, with options for various spectral bands
and resolutions. The Rapid AIT team included members of both Team A and Team B, as well as
a payload team.
At the start of the trial, the imager configuration was selected, and the payload team
began assembly and test of the imager while the S/C bus was being assembled. Integration of the
payload to the S/C bus required different GSE than used previously, but none of the GSE was
non-standard equipment for a typical S/C integration facility. The complete assembly duration
of the S/C was on the same order of magnitude as the previous trials. A payload functional test
was completed a part of the bus functional test. An attempt to take images of the mountains in
the distance proved quite difficult and was not successful due to the focal length of the imager.
While using a test setup for calibration or functional testing is not as interesting as imaging a real
scene, it may be necessary given hardware and timeline constraints. Imager calibration and
alignment were not considered in this experiment and should be investigated in future
demonstrations.
The payload was a developmental model and was not fabricated to withstand
environmental tests. As such, no vibration or TVAC tests were completed on this configuration.
This trial also included mission operations rehearsals using the Chileworks common
ground system. The rehearsals overlapped the factory compatibility test (FCT) in attempts to
condense the Rapid AIT timeline and provide the operations team with more rehearsal
experience. The geographical separation of the AIT, operations, and launch teams, as envisioned
by ORS, creates a problem of situational awareness. Consideration should be given to create a
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system (i.e. telephone, web-based) by which all teams can maintain the schedule and work
together during FCT/rehearsals.

Figure 40. PnPSat-1 Configuration for Trial 6 [29]

4.2 Test Results
A primary goal of the Rapid AIT Demonstration was to investigate the influences on AIT
timeline. Another goal was to determine it the Rapid AIT activities are sufficient to detect
discrepancies/anomalies. The analysis of the Rapid AIT duration and anomaly detection is given
first. Following that analysis, the data from the vibration, TVAC, and CG tests are discussed.
These data may support the reduction of tests conducted at the system level. And finally, a
compilation of lessons learned from the Rapid AIT Demonstration team and observers is
provided.
4.2.1

Rapid AIT Duration

Table 17 shows a summary of the activities conducted in the Rapid AIT test sequence and
their duration for each trial. It can be seen that the average total test time of 14 hr 35 min did not
significantly vary throughout the demonstration indicated by a standard deviation of 20 min. The
lack of variation is probably due to the automation of a majority of the tests. It can be assumed
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that human interaction increases test duration, so automating tests would be the most efficient
use of time. However, it will be important for the test scripts to include adequate limit checking
such that discrepancies do not go unnoticed.
The assembly activities were most variable, with an average of 5 hr 10 min, and standard
deviation of 2 hr 52 min. Figure 41 highlights that assembly duration was influenced by
personnel training and assembly team skill set more than configuration change, though
configuration cannot be discounted. The assembly procedure format was also changed with each
trial to find the format which provided the most efficiency.
As indicated in Figure 41, the assembly time was lowest when the assembly team was
selected based on skill set and had been trained on PnPSat-1 assembly through previous trials. It
should be noted that the configuration assembled in Trial 5 (1hr 28 min total assembly duration)
had only been built once before. However, the level of detail of the assembly procedure was
reduced to an assembly drawing and minimal text which proved more efficient than a text
document with many steps. It appears that the most useful procedure included the assembly
drawing and a table for each panel including the components to be installed with the respective
number of fasteners, torque values, and endpoint connector number (where the component
should be electrically mated).
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Table 17. Rapid AIT Activity Duration Summary
Activity
Assemble Internal Components
to Bus Structure
Bus Functional Test, Internal
Components Only
Assemble External Components
to Bus Structure
Bus Functional Test, Complete
Mass Properties - Weight and
CG
Workmanship Vibration Test
Solar Array Deploy and
Illuminate Test
Bus Functional Test, Complete
Mission Scenarios
Closeouts, Blanketing6
Payload Build/Test

Trial 1
(hh:mm)

Trial 2
(hh:mm)

Trial 3
(hh:mm)

Trial 4
(hh:mm)

Trial 5
(hh:mm)

Trial 6
(hh:mm)

Average
(hh:mm)

Standard
Deviation
(hh:mm)

3:36

02:24

04:57

02:50

00:451

01:22

2:39

01:31

0:50

00:34

01:14

00:40

00:34

00:50

0:47

00:15

3:30

01:46

04:13

03:30

00:43

01:29

2:31

01:23

1:22

01:00

02:00

01:07

01:00

01:17

1:17

00:22

1:00

01:10

01:00

01:30

N/A

00:59

1:07

00:13

1:10

01:20

01:00

01:10

N/A

N/A

1:10

00:08

3

00:053

2

0:57

1:00

00:50

01:00

01:00

N/A

00:10

1:30
8:00
2:00
N/A

01:11
08:13
01:45
N/A

01:05
07:35
02:00
N/A

00:50
08:00
01:30
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
3:004
N/A
3:30

1:09
7:573
1:48
3:30

00:16
00:153
00:14
00:00

Total Assembly

7:06

4:10

9:10

6:20

1:28

2:51

5:10

02:52

Total Test

14:52

14:18

14:54

14:17

1:34

3:06

14:35

00:20

TOTAL RAPID AIT
DURATION

21:58

18:28

26:04

22:07

N/A

N/A

20:51

02:03

1

Bus structure pre-assembled; 2Deployment only; 3Does not include Trial 6; 42.5 orbits only; 5Concurrent with mission scenarios
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Figure 41. Rapid AIT Assembly Durations

4.2.2

Discrepancies
There were multiple discrepancies discovered during the Rapid AIT and Validation tests.

The first discrepancy occurred in Trial 1 and was attributed to GSE failure. The umbilical
command and telemetry (CMD/TLM) link on the S/C had intermittent failures throughout the
trial. It was discovered that the serial card in one of the ground system computers was damaged
during the demonstration setup. Compatibility issues with newer replacement computers
continued to cause CMD/TLM problems. While this was not a result of activities unique to
Rapid AIT, it provides valuable lessons to minimize GSE movement and to maintain spare,
compatible GSE in inventory.
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In addition, a problem was discovered with the S-Band Radio during the Trial 1 bus
functional test. The source of the problem was not located within a reasonable time, so the SBand portion of functional test was removed for the remainder of the trials. After the trial,
additional troubleshooting showed that the problem was only evident in encryption-bypass mode.
Because PnPSat-1 had previously been tested using encryption, this anomaly was not discovered
sooner. However, it could be postulated that if the subsystem had been tested in all possible
modes (bypass and encrypted) as part of the subsystem testing prior to Rapid AIT the
discrepancy could have easily been discovered.
During the Trial 3 validation TVAC test the Solar Array Controller (SAC) ASIM
repeatedly reset during hot cycles. Because the SAC is a developmental component and is not
flight qualified, it is difficult to attribute the discrepancy to the activities of the Rapid AIT
Demonstration. The SAC was moved to a cooler location in further trials to mitigate the
anomaly. The SAC had undergone numerous TVAC tests at the time of failure, so it is unclear if
pre-Rapid AIT tests would have precipitated or uncovered the failure.
In Trial 4, the umbilical CMD/TLM link failed during the first bus functional test. The
problem reoccurred many times throughout the trial. Extensive troubleshooting indicated a
hardware failure on one of the three onboard processors. Because the processors are
developmental components and are not flight qualified, it is difficult to attribute the discrepancy
to the activities of the Rapid AIT Demonstration. Regardless of the cause, this failure could be
easily discovered in subsystem tests prior to Rapid AIT.
Trial 4 was the first attempt at building a new S/C configuration, the success of which
relies heavily on loading correct software configuration files to the S/C and ground station.
These configuration files describe the location/orientation of each component on the S/C.
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Currently, the files are created and/or modified manually which can require many hours. During
the mission scenario test, it was discovered that there were ADCS component orientation errors
in the configuration files. While the anomaly was found in the Rapid AIT test phase and
corrected, situations like this could possibly be avoided if the files were auto-generated in the
mission planning process along with assembly drawings.
There were multiple PnPSat-1 discrepancies discovered during the Rapid AIT
Demonstration. However, only one of those anomalies was not caught by the Rapid AIT tests.
The SAC anomaly was discovered in validation TVAC tests and could not have been discovered
in any other test. It is important to note, though, that the SAC failure occurred after many TVAC
tests indicating that even with a more traditional test program the anomaly may not have been
discovered. It is unclear whether the SAC anomaly was precipitated by Rapid AIT activities or
if it was a result of degradation.
4.2.3

Vibration Test Results
The SpaceWorks PnPSat-1 structural finite element model predicts the first natural

frequencies of 54.5 Hz and 55.5 Hz, using the maximum expected mass of 180 kg. The
measured natural frequencies at the maximum expected mass were 52 Hz and 55 Hz. The first
two modes are X and Y rocking modes. The X-axis mode is shown in Figure 42. The measured
S/C mass of the baseline configuration of the Rapid AIT Demonstration is 113.1 kg, so the
primary modes are expected to be measured at higher frequencies.
Because there is no structural model correlating to the baseline configuration, the Trial 0
data was the standard for comparison. In effect, the Trial 0 S/C is considered the Qualification
Model to which we are comparing a Flight Model (Trails 1-6). Figure 43 plots the frequency
response (first mode only) of the X-axis from each validation tests. The variance of the
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measured natural frequency between tests is low, but there is a noticeable change in amplitude in
the Trial 4 test. The Trial 4 configuration was of mass to the baseline, but with a different mass
distribution due to the relocation of components on the bus structure. The change in mass
distribution explains the difference in response amplitude. The first two natural frequencies are
shown in Table 18 for each vibration test conducted during the demonstration. It can be seen
that the error in natural frequency from the baseline test is ≤3.13%. The Globalstar standards
require ≤ 5% difference in natural frequencies to be qualified by similarity [22], among other
criteria. Based on the Globalstar standards, the S/C built in Trials 1, 3, and 4 may be considered
structurally identical. Although the Trial 4 configuration was quite different, the natural
frequencies were within the 5% threshold. This finding may suggest that an improperly built S/C
would not be caught by the comparison of natural frequencies alone. However, the response at
the first natural frequency in Trial 4 is clearly different than the previous 3 trials, as can be seen
in Figure 43, so a signature-based approach may still be appropriate. Further research should be
conducted to determine more suitable metrics to qualify by similarity.
Both the Rapid AIT and validation vibration tests include a pre and post-random vibe
sine sweep. The natural frequencies from these tests should be nearly identical, indicating no
structural change occurred during the random vibe test. Figure 44 shows that the pre and postrandom vibration data from the Trial 1 validation test (overlaid) are nearly identical. This is
typical of all of the sine sweep data taken during the demonstration.
During the demonstration validation testing, a frequency response in the Z-axis was
measured which was not seen in the system-level tests. Figure 45 shows the peak at 154Hz is not
as prominent in the baseline as in Trials 1, 3, and 4. Troubleshooting of this change in structural
response was inconclusive. The procedure used in the trials was not used on the baseline,
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however, which may suggest that strict adherence to a procedure results in more repeatable
outcomes.

Figure 42. SpaceWorks Finite Element Model of PnPSat-1 First Rocking Mode (X-Axis) [30]

Figure 43. First Mode Frequency Comparison [30]
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Table 18. Primary Mode Error from Baseline
Trial

X-axis Rocking
Mode (Hz)

Percent Error
from Baseline

Y-axis Rocking
Mode (Hz)

Percent Error
from Baseline

Trial 0 (Baseline)

66.4

Trial 1 Rapid

67.09

1.04

69.9

2.07

Trial 1 Validation

67.09

1.04

67.78

1.02

Trial 3 Rapid

67.78

2.08

70.62

3.13

Trial 3 Validation

66.4

0.00

67.78

1.02

Trial 4 Rapid

65.73

1.01 *

69.9

2.07 *

Trial 4 Validation

65.05

2.03 *

68.48

0.00 *

68.48

*Different Configuration – identical structure and mass, different mass distribution.

Figure 44. Pre- and Post-Random Vibration Sine Sweep Response [30]
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Figure 45. Z-Axis Frequency Response Comparisons [30]

4.2.4

Center of Gravity Measurement Results
Center of Gravity (CG) was measured in Trials 4 and 6, per the test description in Section

3.1.3.3. The measured values are compared to predicted values, as shown in Figure 46 and
Figure 47. In both cases, the average measured location is within the Minotaur Launch Vehicle
(L/V) requirement of 0.25in [34]. The CAD model used to predict these locations was a
modified version of the baseline model.
It can be seen from comparing Figure 46 and Figure 47 that the dispersion in measured
CG in Trial 6 was much greater than in Trial 4. The dispersion is most likely due to the use of an
unleveled stand in Trial 6 while a leveled stand was used in Trial 4. However, the procedure
calls for taking 13 measurements while rotating the S/C to eliminate the leveling error. The
result can be seen in the accuracy between the average measured location and predicted location.
In Trial 4, the accuracy is within 0.041in, and in Trial 6 the accuracy is within 0.051in. In this
demonstration, it has been shown that one correlated CAD model has been modified to
accurately predict the CG of a similar configuration within the launch vehicle requirements.
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Figure 46. Trial 4 Center of Gravity

Figure 47. Trial 6 Center of Gravity
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4.2.5

Thermal Balance and TVAC Test Results

Trials 1, 3, and 4 included a Thermal Balance/TVAC test during the validation testing, as
described in Section 3.1.4.2. Trials 1 and 3 can be compared to the baseline (Trial 0) test since
the configurations were very similar.
Table 19 shows the range of panel temperatures in steady-state conditions (thermal balance).
There are eight internal temperature sensors per panel. The panel gradients in Trials 0, 1, and 3
are quite similar, indicating equivalent thermal properties. Trial 4 was conducted with a different
component configuration, which did not include one of the three onboard processors. Because of
the change in configuration, it would be expected that the S/C would have a different
temperature profile. This difference can be seen when comparing the gradients from Trials 0, 1,
and 3 to Trial 4. To validate the Trial 4 results, a simplified analytical model was created, based
on the tuned model from Trial 0. As can be seen in Table 20, the model predicted the steady–
state panel temperatures to within ±2.2° C and was created in a fraction of the time of the
original (on the order of 1 day vs. 1 month). While there is no strict rule regarding thermal
model accuracy, sources indicate that the objective is to obtain the greatest accuracy with the
least cost/time. The Aerospace Corporation Spacecraft Thermal Handbook cited an example of a
sufficiently-tuned model with ±3°C accuracy. ±3°C accuracy is considered adequate because
margin is built into the thermal design to account for a given amount of inaccuracy. Based on
the goal of decreasing cost/time, and the acceptable error, the simplified model created for Trial
4 was a success and may suggest that one well tuned analytical model could be used to very
quickly create an accurate model for a variety of similar configurations. It should be noted that
the timeline of creating a simplified model is dependent upon the engineer’s experience and
complexity of the S/C. PnPSat-1 is a fairly simple satellite, and the results in this case may not
hold true for more complex S/C.
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Table 19. Steady-State Panel Temperatures (Degree Celsius) [31]
Trial 0 (Baseline)
Shroud

-30

Trial 1

-60

-20

Trial 3

-60

-20

Trial 4

-60

-20

-60

Panel +X

23

28

8

13

33

28

8

12

31

27

13

9

30

27

8

5

Panel -X

21

15

5

-1

26

20

5

-1

24

18

6

0

25

19

4

-3

Panel +Y

31

28

16

13

37

34

17

14

35

32

17

14

31

27

9

5

Panel -Y

20

15

4

0

25

20

4

-1

24

20

4

0

25

22

5

-1

Panel +Z

27

22

13

7

34

28

13

8

30

25

13

7

30

27

9

5

Panel -Z

28

21

13

6

32

27

14

7

32

26

14

7

28

22

8

0

Max

31

16

Min

15

-1

Gradient

16

17

37

17

35

17

31

20

-1

17

18

9

18

0

19

-3

17

17

12

12

Table 20. Trial 4 Panel Temperatures Compared to Model Predictions (Degree Celsius) [31]
Shroud

4.2.6

-60

-20
Max

Min

Ave

Predict

Error

Max

Min

Ave

Predict

Error

Panel +X

30.0

27.0

28.5

28.0

0.5

8.0

5.0

6.5

5.6

0.9

Panel -X

25.0

19.0

22.0

24.2

-2.2

4.0

-3.0

0.5

1.8

-1.3

Panel +Y

31.0

27.0

29.0

28.8

0.2

9.0

5.0

7.0

6.5

0.5

Panel -Y

25.0

22.0

23.5

22.9

0.6

5.0

-1.0

2.0

0.5

1.5

Panel +Z

30.0

27.0

28.5

28.6

-0.2

9.0

5.0

7.0

6.3

0.7

Panel -Z

28.0

22.0

25.0

24.3

0.7

8.0

0.0

4.0

2.0

2.0

Lessons Learned
The lessons learned are a compilation of suggestions from various members of the

demonstration team and observers. They are categorized into five areas of interest: S/C Design,
Facility and Equipment, Personnel and Processes, Payload Integration, and Ground System and
Operations. This section highlights the primary lessons, while the complete list can be found in
Appendix E.
4.2.6.1 Spacecraft Design
•

Design S/C and components for ease of testability to reduce test complexity and duration.

•

Hard-coding or hand-coding of flight software or ground software should be avoided.

•

Investigate automated methods for thermal blanket and radiator tape customization, such
as the automated cutting table utilized in Trial 3.
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4.2.6.2 Facility and Equipment
•

A variety of common parts, like connector covers and cables of various lengths, should
be readily available in assembly facility.

•

Display procedures and drawings on large monitors in clean room to eliminate FOD and
increase situational awareness of the entire team.

•

Create a load distribution plan to ensure facility power is adequate for all required
equipment.

•

Ensure software on all equipment is up to date and compatible.

•

Design S/C integration stand for ease of assembly and with multiple functions. For
example, the mass and CG could be performed on the integration stand with incorporated
load cells.

•

Spare GSE must be stocked, to include compatible software and hardware, and should be
regularly tested and calibrated.

4.2.6.3 Personnel and Processes
•

Strict AIT discipline must be enforced to reduce unnecessary human errors. Quality
Assurance Engineers should be utilized.

•

Configuration Control is a full-time job and should not be left to Rapid AIT team.

•

Number of personnel is not as critical as the correct mix of skill sets. Personnel should
be trained in specific areas of expertise and perform only those operations to maintain
proficiency and operate under clearly defined roles.

•

It appears that the optimal format for the assembly procedure includes an assembly
drawing and a table for each panel which lists the components, number of fasteners,
torque value, and endpoint connector.

•

A standard electronic interface control package should be delivered with each component
into inventory, and should include assembly drawings and instructions, analytical models,
operational instructions, and any required software (ex. xTEDS). The electronic package
will allow auto-generation of configuration files, operations procedures, assembly
procedures, etc.

•

Automated test scripts should be a Pass/Fail test with adequate limit checking and error
reporting.

•

Communication/situational awareness between operations site, S/C AIT site, and launch
site requires more consideration.
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4.2.6.4 Payload Integration
•

Payload test facility should be collocated with the S/C AIT facility, and should include
test equipment with similar electrical and mechanical interfaces to the S/C bus.

•

Alignment, calibration, and performance activities required after payload integration to
S/C bus requires more investigation.

•

The payload & bus should be designed to enable real-time image acquisition during
integration and testing to reduce post-integration testing.

•

The nature of the rapid call-up scenario did not limit payload testing capabilities because
all possible configurations had been fully tested prior to being accepted into inventory.
This should remain the model for Chileworks component stock.

4.2.6.5 Ground System and Operations
•

There should be a standard, intuitive command/telemetry naming convention between all
ground systems and components.

•

Create an xTEDS format that provides enough component information for autogeneration of telemetry displays.

•

Operations procedures should be predefined and included in the electronic standard
interface control package.

•

Operations rehearsals can be executed concurrently with AIT and launch site activities
using simulations to familiarize the operations team with the S/C.

•

The ground station should include an indicator of whether S/C telemetry is being
received.

These results and lessons learned can be utilized when forming the Chileworks facility,
operations, and Tier-2 S/C.
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
As a result of perceived threats to critical U.S. space assets, the joint ORS Office was
formed under the Office of Secretary of Defense to provide assured space access to Joint Force
Commanders (JFC). There are multiple approaches to supplementing the JFC’s needs, from
employing an existing system to developing new technology. Tier-2 responses fall in the middle
– using existing technology to deploy an asset within days-weeks of call-up. A Tier-2 response
will require a departure from current Assembly, Integration, and Test (AIT) practices.
In the baseline ORS concept of operations, all components, subsystems, and bus
configurations must pass all qualification tests to be accepted into inventory at their rapid
response facility, Chileworks. It will be from this stock of fully-qualified
components/subsystems that a Tier-2 S/C will be assembled. Because of the previous
qualification, the newly assembled S/C, or flight model, will complete only a subset of less
stringent acceptance tests – called Rapid AIT. The Rapid AIT Demonstration was sponsored to
explore the minimization of AIT timeline to support a six-day call-up using this concept of
operations.
The Rapid AIT Demonstration includes six trials, each of which include a Rapid AIT phase
and a validation test phase. The Rapid AIT phase is designed to minimize the AIT timeline
within ORS constraints. The validation test phase includes traditional tests, like 3-axis vibration
and thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing. The purpose of the validation tests is to verify no errors
were missed or precipitated by the Rapid AIT activities.
Both traditional and non-traditional satellite AIT practices were examined to gather lessons
learned that are applicable to the ORS goals and constraints in development of the test plan.
There are many standards and guidelines which, if strictly followed, would dictate a timeline that
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far exceeds the goals of ORS. There are, however, cases of rapid satellite AIT more akin to
production lines that resulted in a manufacture rate of one satellite per week. For example, the
Iridium, Globalstar, and ORBCOMM programs performed operations in parallel with each
station, or island, providing a specific operation. Full qualification testing was conducted on
initial articles, but the majority of flight articles were subjected to a smaller complement of
acceptance testing. They also showed success by using automated test scripts and procedures.
These are some of the lessons from industry that have been applied in the Rapid AIT test plan.
Using previous research, industry-accepted guidelines, lessons learned, expert knowledge,
and standard industry practices, a test plan was developed by the Principal Investigator and
various team members for the Rapid AIT trials. MIL-STD-1540 served as the basis from which
the Rapid AIT procedure was created. Individual tests were modified, reordered, or removed for
the purposes of meeting the ORS Tier-2 Rapid AIT timeline.
Test data, such as vibrational modes, thermal response, and center of gravity, from both the
Rapid AIT and validation tests were compared to the baseline test data collected prior to the
demonstration. Comparing measurements to a baseline data set to verify similarity of the flight
model to the qualification model is referred to as a signature-based approach, which is similar to
the approach taken in the Globalstar program. In addition, analytical models were used to
predict thermal gradients and center of gravity locations for S/C configurations other than the
baseline. The trials were timed to investigate the influence of personnel, training, and processes
on AIT duration. Discrepancies were recorded during both Rapid AIT and validation tests to
determine if Rapid AIT provides sufficient testing to catch anomalies. And finally, lessons
learned were collected from the team with respect to S/C design, facility and equipment,
personnel and processes, and ground system and operations.
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5.1 Conclusions
A primary goal of the Rapid AIT Demonstration was to investigate influences on AIT
timeline. By timing each trial, it was found that the primary driver to AIT duration was S/C
assembly activities. The total testing duration had little variability, due to the automation of
many individual tests. By examining the trend in assembly duration, the timeline appeared to be
most influenced by personnel training, mix of skill sets in the assembly team, and efficiency of
the assembly procedure. With an assembly team not familiar with PnPSat-1, the total assembly
time was 9 hr, 10 min. In stark contrast, employing an intentionally selected team with PnPSat-1
training and a streamlined procedure, PnPSat-1 was assembled in 1 hr, 28 min.
Plug-and-Play (PnP) technology has proven to be a key enabler in reducing the Rapid AIT
timeline because standard interfaces reduce the number of tools/equipment/time required for
assembly. Another main draw to utilizing PnP components is the advertised flexibility of
changing S/C configurations. However, changing S/C configuration was not without some
difficulty. The PnP supporting software, such as configuration files, is updated manually for a
change in S/C configuration. Updating the files required many hours and contained errors that
resulted in testing anomalies. Manual updates are not realistic under the ORS time constraints
and they result in unnecessary human errors. The process to update configuration files should be
automated, and a configuration control program should be employed to mitigate human errors.
Another goal of this research was to verify if the tests in Rapid AIT were sufficient to
detect anomalies prior to launch. There were multiple anomalies in the demonstration, but only
one was not caught during Rapid AIT. The failure which was detected in a TVAC test occurred
after many similar TVAC tests, so it is possible that a more traditional qualification program
would not have provided additional mission assurance.

89

By examining data from the Rapid AIT and validation tests some conclusions can be
made to support the reduction of tests conducted at the system level. Existing analytical models
were updated for a variety of configurations to predict panel thermal gradients and center of
gravity location. The updated thermal model accurately predicted temperatures at test locations
on the bus structure to within ±2.2°C of measured for each sensor, which is considered
acceptable by the Aerospace Thermal Control Handbook. The updated structural model
predicted the center of gravity location well within the ±0.25 in launch vehicle accuracy
requirement defined in the Minotaur User’s Guide. These results indicate that well-tuned
analytical models of a qualification model can be manipulated to accurately predict S/C
properties of a variety of configurations and may provide confidence in a reduced test program.
Measuring natural frequencies in multiple vibration tests showed that with repeatable
procedures consistent test results can be obtained. The consistency of results with repeatable
procedures was highlighted in the Z-axis vibration tests. All of the demonstration tests showed a
Z-axis response that had not been previously seen in the baseline test. The only difference
between the demonstration and baseline tests was the strict adherence to a procedure during the
demonstration. The Z-axis vibration data suggests that the use of repeatable procedures results
in more consistent outcomes.
The consistency of the measured natural frequencies was again illustrated when
comparing the response of the trial configurations to the baseline configuration. The
comparisons showed that the first and second natural frequencies of all configurations were
within 3.13% of the baseline test. In the Globalstar program, 5% deviation between qualification
model and flight model natural frequencies served as a constraint for qualification by similarity.
Because multiple S/C configurations met this constraint when compared to a single qualification
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model, more study should be given to the development of the metrics by which a S/C is qualified
by similarity.
Finally, an extensive list of lessons learned from the Rapid AIT trials have been compiled
for incorporation into the Chileworks concept of operations. For example, it was found that the
number of personnel on the AIT team was less important than the correct mix of skill sets, and
that the personnel should have well-defined roles. This is comparable to the ORBCOMM and
Globalstar “island” concept of operations where the S/C was moved through stations which
performed specific operations. Also, test discipline and situational awareness among team
members is critical to decreasing the AIT duration.
Based on the analysis of the Rapid AIT Demonstration results, it is the author’s opinion
that the ORS Office is on the right track to meeting the Rapid AIT goals. There are, however,
many factors which can affect the outcome of the Rapid AIT process. Therefore, more research
should be conducted to address some of the remaining questions.

5.2 Future Work
While many valuable lessons learned have been captured from the Rapid AIT
Demonstration, there are still questions that can be answered with further research. While the
thermal and structural models were used to accurately predict panel thermal gradients and center
of gravity location for multiple S/C configurations, more research should be done on the accurate
prediction of structural properties in various configurations. It is the author’s opinion that refined
structural models may boost confidence in the reduction of vibration tests during Rapid AIT.
An investigation into the effect of S/C complexity on the Rapid AIT process may be of
value to ORS. PnPSat-1 is a relatively simple satellite when compared to satellites being
conceptualized by ORS Tier-2. As is shown in the studies described in Chapter 2, the
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relationship between test thoroughness, S/C complexity, and on-orbit failures is not linear.
Consequently, conclusions drawn from this demonstration – model prediction accuracy,
assembly and test durations, personnel requirements, etc. – need to be validated for a more
complex S/C.
The optimal level of modularity was not investigated in this demonstration. Only the
baseline vision of component-level modularity was exercised, though other options do exist. A
lower level of modularity (component or piece part) provides more flexibility for the S/C design,
but may result in longer assembly and test durations. A higher level of modularity (subsystem or
bus) decreases the flexibility of S/C design, but could drastically reduce the Rapid AIT timeline.
Further study of the modularity tradeoffs would be beneficial to determining the highest level of
flexibility attainable within the ORS time constraint.
An investigation into payload calibration and alignment procedures should be done
because they were not evaluated during this demonstration. Calibration and alignment activities
can dramatically increase the Rapid AIT timeline. There are various methods for calibration and
alignment which should be considered to determine the best approach for mission success within
the ORS time constraint.
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Appendix A.

System-Level Test Descriptions

This appendix lists the primary system-level tests discussed in this thesis. This information comes directly from MIL-STD-340A and
SMAD.
Test
Functional Test

Electromagnetic
Compatibility
(EMC)

Shock Test

Acoustic Test

Vibration Test

Table 21. System-Level Test Descriptions
Purpose
Description
Verifies that the mechanical and electrical performance of the
Exercises all mechanical devices, and electrical and fiber-optic
vehicle meet the specification requirements, including compatibility
circuits through all mission phases. For at least one functional
with ground support equipment, and validates all test techniques and test in the qualification sequence, the vehicle will be operated
software algorithms used in computer-assisted commanding and data through a mission profile with all events occurring in actual
processing. Proper operation of all redundant units or mechanisms
flight sequence to the extent practicable.
should be demonstrated to the maximum extent practicable.
Demonstrates electromagnetic compatibility of the vehicle and
The test will demonstrate satisfactory electrical and electronic
ensures that adequate margins exist in a simulated launch, orbital,
equipment operation in conjunction with the expected
disposal, and return-from-orbit electromagnetic environment.
electromagnetic radiation from other subsystems or equipment,
such as from other vehicle elements and ground support
equipment.
Demonstrates the capability of the vehicle to withstand or, if
In the shock test or series of shock tests, the vehicle will be
appropriate, to operate in the induced shock environments. The
subjected to shock transients that simulate the extreme expected
shock test also yields the data to validate the extreme and maximum
shock environment to the extent practicable. All devices on the
expected unit shock requirement.
vehicle capable of imparting significant shock excitation to
vehicle units will be activated.
Demonstrates the ability of the vehicle to endure acoustic acceptance The vehicle in its ascent configuration will be installed in an
testing and meet requirements during and after exposure to the
acoustic test facility capable of generating sound fields or
extreme expected acoustic environment in flight. Except for items
fluctuating surface pressures that induce vehicle vibration
whose environment is dominated by structure-borne vibration, the
environments sufficient for vehicle qualification. Appropriate
acoustic test also verifies the adequacy of unit vibration qualification dynamic instrumentation will be installed to measure vibration
levels and serves as a qualification test for items not tested at a lower responses at attachment points of critical and representative
level of assembly.
units.
Demonstrates the ability of the vehicle to endure vibration
The vehicle and a flight-type adapter, in the ascent
acceptance testing and meet requirements during and after exposure
configuration, will be vibrated using one or more shakers
to the extreme expected environment in flight. Except for items
through appropriate vibration fixtures. Vibration will be applied
whose response is dominated by acoustic excitation, the vibration
in each of 3 orthogonal axes, one direction being parallel to the
test also verifies the adequacy of unit vibration qualification levels
vehicle thrust axis. Instrumentation will be installed to measure,
and serves as a qualification test for items that have not been tested
in those same 3 axes, the vibration inputs and the vibration
at a lower level of assembly.
responses at attachment points of critical and representative
units.

96

Test
Thermal Cycle

Purpose
The thermal cycle test demonstrates the ability of the vehicle to
withstand the stressing associated with flight vehicle thermal cycle
acceptance testing, with a qualification margin on temperature range
and maximum number of cycles.

Thermal Balance

The thermal balance test provides the data necessary to verify the
analytical thermal model and demonstrates the ability of the vehicle
thermal control subsystem to maintain the specified operational
temperature limits of the units and throughout the entire vehicle. The
thermal balance test also verifies the adequacy of unit thermal design
criteria.

Thermal Vacuum
Test (TVAC)

The thermal vacuum test demonstrates the ability of the vehicle to
meet qualification requirements under vacuum conditions and
temperature extremes which simulate those predicted for flight plus
a design margin, and to withstand the thermal stressing environment
of the vehicle thermal vacuum acceptance test plus a qualification
margin on temperature range and number of cycles.

Mass Properties

Mass property measurements are taken to ensure onboard ADCS
will be able to perform as required. Mass property requirements are
dictated by launch vehicles for both weight and spin stabilization
performance.
The purpose of the burn-in test is to detect material and
workmanship defects which occur early in the component life.

Burn-In or Wear-In

Factory
Compatibility Test
(FCT)

This test must be conducted to verify the operational ground stations
can interface properly with the satellite.

97

Description
The vehicle will be placed in a thermal chamber at ambient
pressure, and a functional test will be performed to assure
readiness for the test. The vehicle will be operated and
monitored during the entire test, except that vehicle power may
be turned off if necessary to reach stabilization at the cold
temperature.
The qualification vehicle will be tested to simulate the
thermal environment experienced by the vehicle during its
mission. Tests will be capable of validating the thermal model
over the full mission range of seasons, equipment duty cycles,
ascent conditions, solar angles, maximum and minimum unit
thermal dissipations including effects of bus voltage variations,
and eclipse combinations so as to include the worst-case hot and
cold temperatures for all vehicle units.
The vehicle will be placed in a thermal vacuum chamber and a
functional test performed to assure readiness for chamber
closure. A thermal cycle begins with the vehicle at ambient
temperature. The temperature is raised to the specified high level
and stabilized. Following the high-temperature soak, the
temperature will be reduced to the lowest specified level and
stabilized. Following the low-temperature soak, the vehicle will
be returned to ambient temperature to complete one thermal
cycle. Functional tests will be conducted during the first and last
thermal cycle at both the high- and low-temperature.
Weight, center of gravity, and moments of inertia are measured.
Based on the final mass properties, balance and despin weights,
if any, are calculated and installed. If the launch vehicle is spin
stabilized during ascent, spin balance is performed.
The total operating time for electronic and electrical component
burn-in shall be 300 hours including the operating time during
thermal cycling.
Operational sequences of commands are sent to the S/C to set its
operating modes in as realistic manner as possible. The data that
will be transmitted from the S/C on orbit are recovered and
checked to assure that the ground control software is designed
and coded properly.

Appendix B.

Requirements Verification Matrix
Validation / Verification

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Attitude knowledge

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

Sun vector knowledge from sun sensors only
Position Velocity knowledge
GPS provides state vector for propagator
State Vector adjustable by ground command
ADCS supports sun-track mode
ADCS supports nadir pointing mode

Qualifying
Configurations

Rapid AIT

Component
Level

Existing Test

Analysis

Parameter or Metric

Inspection

Test

x

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim
MissionSim

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x
x

x

8

ADCS supports rate-damping (inertial hold)

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

9

ADCS performs momentum dumping

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

10

Maximum slew rate

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

11

ADCS shall utilize reaction wheels

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

x

12

ADCS utilizes torque rods for momentum dump

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

x

13

Damp LV tip-off up to 2deg/sec

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

14
15
16
17
18
19

Autonomous sun point within 90min.
Separation
Power-on Reset
Minimum determination sensors available (sun
sensor)
S/C is 3-axis stabilized
ADCS Component polarities are verified as
installed

MissionSim
Off-nominal Scenario

x
MissionSim

x

BusFunc
ADCS BusFunc
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x

x

x

20
21
22

Magnetometer direction/magnitude verified
Torque Rod commands will contingency expire
after 1 sec
Inertial Measurement Unit responsive to S/C
Motion

ADCS BusFunc; Component Functional

x

BusFunc

x

BusFunc
ADCS BusFunc; Component Functional

x

x

ADCS BusFunc; Component Functional

x

x

23

Monitor reaction wheel saturation and desaturate

ADCS Functional; MissionSim

x

BusFunc

x

24

Sun Sensor responsive to illumination

ADCS Functional

x

BusFunc

x

MissionSim

x

25

Provide an S-Band TT&C link

Comm Functional; MissionSim

26

Provide NSA Type 1 encryption on TT&C link

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

27

Commanding for TT&C key changes

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

28

S/C supports 8 TT&C contacts/day @ 10min. duration
S/C allows S-Band commanding without FSW
operating

Comm Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

29

MissionSim

x

30

Support ground initiated contacts

Comm Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

31

Support scheduled S/C initiated contacts

Comm Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

32

Authenticates TT&C commands using VCC

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

33

TT&C Downlink & Uplink margins >3dB

34

Output power

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

35

Downlink Rate

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

36

Uplink Rate

Comm Functional; MissionSim

x

37

Bit Error Rate

Comm Functional; MissionSim

38

Provide UHF tactical data link

Comm Functional; MissionSim

39

Provide AES software encryption on UHF link

Comm Functional; MissionSim

40

Commanding for UHF key changes

Comm Functional; MissionSim

41

S/C supports 8 UHF contacts/day @ 10min. duration

Comm Functional; MissionSim

42

S/C allows UHF commanding without FSW operating

Comm Functional; Off-nominal Scenario

43

Support ground initiated UHF contacts

Comm Functional; MissionSim

44

UHF Downlink & Uplink margins >3dB

45

Output power

46

Downlink Rate

x

47

Uplink Rate

x

Comm Functional; Off-nominal Scenario

x

x

x
MissionSim

x

x

MissionSim

x

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

x
x

Comm Functional; MissionSim

99

x

48
49

Bit Error Rate
Provide UHF antenna pointing during contacts
(ground antenna? ESA)

x
Comm Functional; MissionSim

50

S/C detects LV separation

MissionSim; light band drop test

Autonomously deploy solar arrays

Factory
Compat

x
x

Deployment test; first motion; MissionSim

MissionSim
MissionSim/S
A Deploy

51

x

52

Separation

Deployment test; first motion; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

53

Power-on Reset

Deployment test; first motion; MissionSim

x

x

MissionSim
MissionSim/S
A Deploy

x

54
55

Solar Array deployable by ground command

Off-nominal Scenario

S/C command receptive in all mission phases

MissionSim

x

S/C shall discover & utilize SPA devices

Component Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim
MissionSim/B
usFunc

57

S/C Re-registers components

Component Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

58

Component Reset

Component Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

59

Power-on Reset

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

56

x

60

Load FSW based on user-defined task list

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

61

Manage the on-board schedule of mission activities

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

62

Allow ground command to schedule contacts

Comm Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

63

Structure Temperatures within limits

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

64

Component Temperatures within limits

Component Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

65

Device ASIM provides watchdog reset

Component Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

66

Provide control of telemetry points in RTSOH

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

67

Distributed system time and PPS to all devices

CDH Functional;MissionSim;Component functional

x

MissionSim

x

68

System clock adjustable by ground command

MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

69

S/C supports RTSOH downlink

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

70

S/C supports SSOH downlink

MissionSim

MissionSim

x

71

Battery sized to support peak power demand

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

x

72

Solar array sized for orbit average energy needs

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

x

73

Battery charging does not require FSW

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

74

Endpoints provide settable OC trip

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

75

S/C attempts reset of tripped endpoints

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x
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x

76

Endpoints set in Config File to default to power-off

x

77

Power hubs provide voltage and current monitors

x

78

Main bus voltage & current monitor is provided

x

79

Solar array voltage and current monitor is provided

80
Component power states controlled
81
82

Transition to power-positive state at LV separation
Maintains power-positive state in nominal mission
phases

x
Power Functional; Component
Functional;MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

Power Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

Power Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

83

Provide battery charging from solar array source

84

Monitor battery state and prevent overcharge

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

85

Battery Charge/Discharge rate nominal

Power Functional; MissionSim

x

MissionSim

x

86

Monitor battery UV and autonomously sun point

Power Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

87

Monitor battery UV and shed all loads at 26V

Power Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

88

Monitor battery UV and reset trip flag at 27V
Monitor battery SOC and prioritize charging activity
as appropriate

Power Functional; MissionSim

MissionSim

x

Power Functional; Off-Nominal Scenario

MissionSim

x

Workmanship
Vibe

x

89

x

90

S/C provided test connector for HWIL testing

x

91

S/C provides EPS single-point ground

x

92
Primary structure fundamental frequencies

Vibration

93

Overall RMS level at XX location

Vibration

x

94

Steady State temps at hot and cold dwells

Thermal

x

95

S/C functions nominally at both hot and cold dwells

Thermal

x

x

96

S/C functions nominally in vacuum environment

Thermal

x

x

97

Bakeout- As a function of time/temp

Thermal

98

Conducted emissions

EMI/EMC

x

99

Radiated emissions

EMI/EMC

x

10
0

S/C meets LV physical envelope requirements

Mass Properties

x

101

x

x
x

x
Mass Props

x

Appendix C.

Responsive Space 7 Surveys

102

103

104

Appendix D.

Responsive Space 7 Conference Survey Results

Introduction
As part of the Rapid Assembly, Integration and Test (AI&T) Demonstration, the Plug-and-Play
Satellite (PnPSat) was built and tested during the 3 days of the 7th Annual Responsive Space
Conference (RS7), 28-30 April 2009. The spacecraft build was completed in the Aerospace
Engineering Facility (AEF), Kirtland AFB, NM, while a live webcast put the demonstration in
the view of all conference participants. Daily spacecraft build updates provided interaction with
the audience, explanation of the ORS Tier-2 concept, Rapid AI&T concepts and rationale, and
areas requiring improvement or investigation. In an effort to capture suggestions or lessons from
a broad experience base, the participants were urged to provide feedback throughout the
conference.
There were multiple formats for audience participation and feedback:
• Via spacecraft build updates, where audience members were asked to define the satellite
mission, test sequence, and offer advice;
• Through a blog, in which pictures and status of the spacecraft build were posted and
questions to the build team were answered;
• Survey participation, geared toward the activities of the conference and the
demonstration.
This report will summarize the results from the surveys completed at the conference.
Because the RS7 audience was exposed to daily ORS-led updates, conference proceedings, and
had access to ORS team members for discussion, it can be assumed that the survey participants
had an appropriate understanding of the background, context, and goals of ORS and were
suitable participants. Surveys are being provided to other personnel in the spacecraft and launch
industries to gather more data points. However, those results will be provided in a
supplementary report as the participant background knowledge is unknown.

Survey Format
The surveys were designed to take only a short amount of time as participants would be filling
them out at a booth in the exhibit hall. Three different surveys were handed out, one per day of
the conference, approximately 4 questions each. Those surveys had the following focus areas:
Survey 1: Mission Planning and Rapid Launch
Survey 2: Spacecraft Test Requirements
Survey 3: Logistics, Training, and Facilities.
The three RS7 surveys can be found in Appendix C.
Most of the survey questions were formatted such that the participant could circle the answer
most closely represented their opinion, each with an area for written discussion or explanation.
In questions that had an “other” option, the most common responses will be discussed herein.

105

Survey Results
The answers from each survey received at the RS7 conference were compiled and each
question’s results will be discussed in this section. Each multiple choice question will have its
results displayed graphically, depicting the percentage of each response. Results from short
answer questions will be tabulated. In instances where a single participant circled two or more
answers, each answer was treated as a separate response. This accounts for the potential
mismatch between number of surveys received and number of responses.
Mission Planning
The following question was asked in Survey 1:
Considering payload complexity and post-integration alignment/calibration activities, which of
the following missions do you think is the most difficult to attain within a 6-day call-up scenario?
Why?
a. Communications
b. Navigation
c. Weather
d. Surveillance
14 surveys were collected this day, and there were 16 answers to this question. The breakdown
of responses can be found in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Most Difficult Mission for 6 Day Call-Up
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It can be seen that, by far, surveillance was chosen as the most difficult mission to attain within a
6 day call-up scenario. The majority of responses indicated cleanliness requirements and
alignment requirements for electro-optical imaging sensors as the drivers. One participant
indicated Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Tests may be required for RF-type sensors and
may increase the timeline and AI&T complexity.
While surveillance sensors may have stringent alignment and cleanliness requirements,
communications, navigation, and weather sensors have calibration activities of their own.
Navigation sensors must have very accurate attitude control, and communication payloads will
require complex EMC tests. Licensing and frequency management for communication satellites
may also pose issues not easily resolved within a 6-day call-up.
It is certain that sensor calibration, if occurring during the 6-day call-up, would increase both
AI&T timeline and complexity for any of the four categories.
Rapid Launch
The following questions were asked in Survey 1:
What do you believe is currently the driving factor of Launch Cost in the U.S.? Is this something
that can be reduced for ORS launches?
a. Management
b. Hardware
c. Processing/Facility Costs
d. Timeline
e. Other
What do you believe is currently the driving factor of Launch Schedule in the U.S.? Is this
something that can be reduced for ORS launches?
a. Management
b. Safety/Security Guidelines
c. Technical Difficulty
d. Unique Payload Requirements
e. Other
14 surveys were collected this day, and there were 15 answers to the question of Launch Cost
and 17 answers to the question of Launch Schedule. The breakdown of responses can be found
in Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 2. Current Driver of Launch Cost
The majority response to this question was none of the provided choices of Management,
Hardware, Timeline, or Processing/Facility Costs. Within the group of participants choosing
“Other” for their answer, the primary response was low launch rate/volume. There is a
significant amount of infrastructure that must be maintained for launch operations, such as
processing facilities/equipment, expirables, and launch control facilities/equipment. Since these
overhead costs are spread amongst each customer, it makes sense that as number of customers
increase the percentage of overhead cost to each customer decreases. Additionally, an increase
in launch rate would perhaps decrease the amount of retraining and rehearsing prior to each
launch, resulting in a decrease in both cost and schedule.
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Figure 3. Current Driver of Launch Schedule
The primary response to this question indicated that Safety and Security Guidelines is the biggest
driver to Launch Schedule. Currently, preparations begin 6 months – 1 year prior to the
scheduled launch date. Much of this time is used to complete required safety/ security activities
or documentation, currently unique to each spacecraft. All spacecraft and launch vehicle
procedures must be reviewed and accepted by Range Safety personnel prior to use at the launch
site. Some suggestions for mitigation of this schedule driver were “Relax them – overcome with
having more launches,” and “Use the same processes over and over.” Surely, if launch rate
increased processes would eventually become streamlined and personnel would maintain a state
of readiness required for quick turn-around. And utilizing the same processes repeatedly would
be vital. Some other mitigation techniques may be:
• Provide a set of range procedures common to each spacecraft type expected, with only
few procedures unique to spacecraft based on specific payload/propulsion system/battery
etc.
• Have well-defined security requirements that are applicable to all spacecraft within the
given classification level.
• Integrate spacecraft to launch vehicle at the spacecraft integration facility, thereby
removing unique procedures for various facilities/equipment, and differing safety and
security guidelines.
• Co-locate spacecraft integration facility with launch facility.
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Spacecraft Test Requirements
The following question was asked in Survey 2:
Assuming a representative design has already passed qualification tests, what level of risk is
associated with NOT performing the following system-level tests:
(1=Low Risk; 5= High Risk)
a. Thermal Vacuum: 1 2 3 4 5
b. Vibration: 1 2 3 4 5
c. Electromagnetic Compatibility: 1 2 3 4 5
d. 200-Hr Burn-In: 1 2 3 4 5
e. Factory Compatibility: 1 2 3 4 5
f. Mission Scenarios: 1 2 3 4 5
13 surveys were collected this day, and there were 13 answers to the questions. The breakdown
of responses can be found in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Risk of Eliminating System-Level Tests
With 1 being the lowest risk and 5 being highest risk, the participants largely agreed that
eliminating any of the above tests introduced a moderate level of risk. There is of course risk
associated with eliminating any test, but the ORS office may deem “moderate risk” acceptable
for an urgent need spacecraft. Of these tests, however, eliminating vibration testing was
considered most risky. The vibration test validates the primary modes of the spacecraft which is
a design property and as such could be validated through analysis or on a qualification model.
Vibration testing could also precipitate workmanship errors like loose connections on wiring
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harness or structure. These errors could be mitigated through good assembly practices and
quality assurance checks, but a short test (perhaps 1-axis versus all 3) could be performed within
the rapid call-up window to verify connections are solid.
The second highest risk was assigned to elimination of long burn-in testing. Burn-in tests are
used to detect infant mortality and intermittent failures. The burn-in could be conducted at the
component level and through intermittent functional tests while in inventory.
Eliminating electromagnetic compatibility testing (EMC) constitutes the third highest risk as
seen by survey participants. EMC tests detect RF interference and are most important for RFsensitive payloads. In the case of an RF-sensitive payload, the EMC tests could be part of the
payload integration, test, and calibration activities. For other payloads, the EMC tests may not
be necessary as workmanship is hard to detect and the design can be previously qualified and
supported by analysis. If a workmanship mistake occurred such as not installing or damaging RF
components, the bus functional tests should catch the errors.
Spacecraft Modularity
The following questions were asked in Surveys 1 and 2:
What level of modularity do you think should be applied to Responsive Spacecraft?
a. Very Modular – Components on shelf
b. Somewhat Modular – Subsystems on shelf
c. Not at all Modular – Fully-assembled bus on shelf
What level of modularity should be applied to Responsive Payloads?
a. Very Modular – Pieces on shelf
b. Somewhat Modular – Partially-assembled, uncalibrated payloads on shelf
c. Not at all Modular – Fully-assembled, calibrated payloads on shelf
14 surveys were collected this day, and there were 15 answers to the question of Bus Modularity
and 13 answers to the question of Payload Modularity. The breakdown of responses can be
found in Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 5. Modularity of Responsive Spacecraft Buses
The desire to balance flexibility with responsiveness is clear in the responses regarding
modularity of the spacecraft bus. Most participants indicated that component-level modularity is
too drastic and will complicate/elongate AI&T. It is interesting that a small percentage chose
“Not at all Modular.” While low modularity does provide for a faster AI&T timeline, it may also
complicate on-shelf testing requirements and increase required inventory. If inventory is not
increased, flexibility in the capabilities that can be delivered will be reduced.

Figure 6. Modularity of Responsive Spacecraft Payloads
Here again the balance of flexibility and fast response is chosen for modularity of payloads.
While the same percentage of responses indicated “Very Modular” as did in the case of bus
modularity, the percentage of “Not at all Modular” increased. This could be directly related to
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the calibration requirements of a sensor that would make a 6 day call-up impractical. Fully
integrated sensor packages ready to be integrated to the bus is most similar to the U-2 concept
for space. However, the majority of the responses indicated “Somewhat Modular” is best,
allowing updates to the payload as technology advances or as needs change.
Custom Bus vs. Common Bus Architecture
The following questions were asked in Survey 3:
Which end of the spectrum should the ORS Office be investigating for Responsive Space
Satellites:
a. Common Bus Architecture – One bus works for all ORS missions
b. Custom Bus Architecture – The bus is customized for the mission, within the 6-day call-up
window
6 surveys were collected this day, and there were 6 answers to the question. The breakdown of
responses can be found in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Custom Bus vs. Common Bus Architecture
It is interesting that the divide between Custom Bus and Common Bus Architecture is equal.
That may suggest that the answer is in the middle somewhere, which is perhaps intuitive. A very
intriguing suggestion received was storing multiple common buses for varying mission types.
The participant with this suggestion likened it to FedEx’s multiple sized boxes. This could also
be likened to the operational military and tied to the U-2 concept: U-2’s, UAV’s, EP-3’s and F16’s all carry different sensor packages based on their capability and mission objectives. This
could also be a model for Responsive Spacecraft.
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Component Retest Rate
The following questions were asked in Survey 3:
How often do you believe components/subsystems should be re-tested for functionality while in
storage?
a. Never
b. Yearly
c. Twice Yearly
d. Monthly
e. Other
6 surveys were collected this day, and there were 6 answers to this question. The breakdown of
responses can be found in Figure 8

.
Figure 8. Component Retest Rate
The rationale for only low level system testing conducted during a 6 day call-up rapid AI&T is
based upon the assumption that components (or subsystems) are separately verified for
functionality and performance. If components sit on a shelf for some period of time, they may
start to fail, perhaps from age, latent failure, or environmental degradation. Therefore, there
should be a rechecking of these components at some interval, to ensure best chance of success at
call-up. Most participants in this question indicated that components should be tested twice
yearly. However, this number may vary greatly based on Ops Tempo and component lifetime
concerns.
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Personnel Retrain/Exercise Rate
The following questions were asked in Survey 3:
How often do you believe Rapid AI&T personnel should retrain or conduct exercises to maintain
readiness for an urgent need call-up?
a. Continuously
b. Yearly
c. Twice Yearly
d. Monthly
e. Other
6 surveys were collected this day, and there were 6 answers to this question. The breakdown of
responses can be found in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Personnel Retrain Rate
The respondents in this survey felt that AI&T personnel should be either continuously or nearly
continuously retraining or conducting exercises to maintain proficiency and readiness for a rapid
call-up scenario. This philosophy would have to be weighed against the risk of damaging or
exceeding lifetime of flight hardware used in the exercise. Another option could utilize test
articles for exercises, but varying configurations would be vital in the retrain process and may be
difficult with a limited number of test parts.
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Rapid AI&T Facility Considerations
The following question was asked in Survey 3:
What factors would you consider when designing a Responsive Space Assembly, Integration, and
Test facility?
6 surveys were collected this day, and there were 6 answers to this question. The responses can
be found in Table 1.
Table 1. Rapid AI&T Facility Considerations
It has to be about your process control and creating a process that minimizes assembly and workmanship risk.
Work Flow, accessibility to SC transport, classification.
Test equipment and/or diagnostics capability - there will be issues! Need to be able to isolate the root cause quickly.
Standard Robust Interfaces, architecture flexibility.
All testing equipment in house with spares of long lead components most likely to break.
Storage space with power and network, environmental, all test equipment available as needed.

These suggestions can help ORS design a facility conducive for Tier-2 response.
PnP Standards in Industry
The following question was asked in Survey 3:
Do you envision Plug-and-Play interface standards being applied across the U.S. Spacecraft
Industry? World-wide?
6 surveys were collected this day, and there were 6 answers to this question. The responses can
be found in Table 2.
Table 2. PnP Standards in Industry
Yes, if standards can be matured to a point where they are not in constant state of flux and there is a business case to
use them.
Not in near term - too untested. Perhaps eventually in U.S. World-wide much more difficult to imagine due to
security, tech transfer.
Standards - iffy. Modularity - more likely
Yes.
Yes, especially with ASIMS.
Yes, it needs to in order for the business case to work. May not be only PnP but exceptions should not be the rule.

These comments indicate that PnP is an accepted technology standard in the industry with hopes
of becoming more mainstream. PnP should continue to be a basis for Tier-2 satellites.

Conclusion
In an effort to gain suggestions and lessons from the space community, short surveys were given
at the RS7 Conference. Questions were posed in the areas of mission design, launch operations,
test requirements, facility layout, logistics and training. The participants, with varied roles and
experiences in the community, provided suggestions and insight that could be very useful to the
ORS office in determining the concept of operations for the future Chileworks facility.

116

Appendix E.

Lessons Learned

This is a full list of lessons learned/observations/suggestions compiled from various Rapid AIT
team members and observers after each trial.
Spacecraft Design
•
•
•
•

•

•

Design S/C and components for testability.
Use larger or captive fasteners on connectors.
Use Connector Keying whenever possible.
Nothing should be Hard-Coded or Hand-Coded.
– Flight software should not be designed for a specific set of components or vehicle
configuration
– Solar Array orientation hard-coded in ADCS SW
– Configuration Files do exist on PnPSat-1 but are hand-coded
Thermal Blanket and Tape customization method is needed
– Utilized automated cutting table in Trial 3 – tapes cut in few hours, installed in
fraction of time.
– Some trade-off in coverage as shapes are simplified
– Previously fabricated blankets used for all trials
S/C should have a dual capability for hard line and RF command/telemetry.

Facility and Equipment
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

Test equipment should be located inside the clean room.
A variety of connector covers and cable lengths should be available in assembly facility.
– Should be included in parts list, like number/size of bolts, washers
Display procedures and drawings on monitors in clean room.
– Eliminates paper and pen FOD
– Provides situational awareness to all members of team
Facility power is critical:
– Accurate map of available circuits and ratings
– Plan GSE load distribution to prevent tripping breakers
– Power strips are not adequate without load distribution plan
Ensure software on all equipment is up to date and compatible.
– AFRL cutting table had old version of SolidWorks, recreated drawings to get tapes
made within week.
For maximum flexibility, use adjustable GSE.
– For example, RF test equipment should avoid the use of fixed attenuators or items
tuned for specific frequencies.
Design Integration Stand for ease of assembly and with multiple functions.
– Measurement of vehicle mass and CG can be performed by a support stand with
integrated load cells.
– Integration Stand should provide adequate access to all panels, even the bottom.
Replacement/Spare GSE parts must be stocked/available.
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•

– Assumption that common parts like computers will be available is false – updated PC
hardware and software may not be compatible. (XP vs. Vista)
– GSE should be regularly tested/inspected/calibrated.
– Cover unused connectors to prevent failures.
Lifting interface should be standardized across ORS vehicles so that a standard lifting
fixture could be designed with adjustable supports and leveling capabilities

Personnel and Processes
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Strict AI&T discipline must be enforced.
– Cover unused connectors (GSE and Flight HW), follow procedures, do not alter
scripts or GSE setup without QA-approved redline (not verbal).
Configuration Control is a full-time job and should not be left to engineers.
– Utilize inventory control SW
Number of personnel is not as critical as the correct mix of skill sets
– Personnel should be trained in specific areas of expertise and perform only those
operations to maintain proficiency and have clearly defined roles.
Assembly and Test Procedure format requires investigation.
– Assembly drawing vs. assembly procedure
– Should be automated, to eliminate human cut and paste errors.
– Ideal level of detail seems to be drawing plus table of components per panel –
includes number of fasteners, torque value, endpoint connector
A standard electronic ICD should be delivered with components into inventory.
– Items such as number of fasteners, torque, required equipment, etc. should be easily
parsed into assembly procedures.
– Items such as operations considerations, telemetry value definitions, etc. should be
easily parsed into operations manuals.
– Should include xTEDS and ASIM code.
– These files will also be used to create configuration files, which are currently required
to sync the ground station with the S/C configuration.
Determine contingency procedures – troubleshoot vs. ignore vs. replace component vs.
remove article from assembly line and start over.
Automated test scripts should be “Go/NoGo” type with adequate limit checking.
Communication/situational awareness between operations site, S/C AIT site, and launch
site requires more investigation.

Payload Integration
•
•
•
•

Payload test facility should be collocated with the S/C AIT facility, and should include
test equipment with similar electrical and mechanical interfaces to the S/C bus.
Payload modules should be stored in either a clean room or nitrogen purged containers.
The S/C AIT facility should have a fully capable optical test station in the integration
clean room.
Alignment, calibration, and performance activities required after payload integration to
S/C bus requires more investigation.
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•
•

- If a performance test is required after integration, optical test equipment should be
used for imaging rather than distant scenes due to the focal length of space-based
imagers. Steering mirrors or mobile test stand can be used to project a scene onto the
payload optics.
The payload & bus should be designed to enable real-time image acquisition during
integration and testing. Limitations on the data rate on the desktop SPA and the bus
delayed the payload configuration and the post-integration payload functional tests.
The nature of the rapid call-up scenario did not limit payload testing capabilities.
- All of the possible configurations had been fully tested prior to being accepted into
inventory. Had a new configuration been requested, more time would be required for
testing.

Ground System and Operations
•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•

There should be a standard command/telemetry naming convention between all ground
systems and components.
- Mnemonics should be unique, and not easily confused.
Current xTEDS don't provide enough information to automate generation of displays.
- Currently done manually, which requires knowledge of S/C and component
operations.
Operations procedures should be predefined and included in the electronic Standard ICD.
Operations rehearsals can be executed concurrently with AIT and launch site activities
using simulations.
When S/C AIT is complete, operations team should work with AIT team to do
combination Factory Compatibility Test and Dress Rehearsal.
- Use operations ground system and flight-ready S/C in an RF end-to-end
configuration.
Commanding interface should provide knowledge of every command sent to S/C.
- Procedures should be automated as much as possible to most efficiently utilize
contact time.
- Scripts should prompt operator at key steps.
- Limit checking, timeouts can allow script to continue, but should update operator at
every step.
- Graphical representation of script flow has been successfully used previously.
Navigating a file structure to find appropriate command is not efficient and too
cumbersome. A more user-friendly command look-up interface should be investigated.
The ground station should include an indicator of whether S/C telemetry is received.
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